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PREFACE 
Representatives from 132 nations assembled in Vancouver in June 
of 1976 to  convene HABITAT, the United Nations Conference on Human 
Settlements. The Conference was a global inquiry into solutions of the 
critical and urgent problems of human settlements created by the conver- 
gence of two historic events: unprecedentedly high rates of population 
growth and massive rural to  urban migration. 
Rapidly growing populations strain health and education budgets, 
complicate efforts to utilize a nation's manpower efficiently, and exacerbate 
~rob lems  connected with the ~rovision of adequate supplies of food, 
energy, water, housing, and transport and sanitary facilities. A better under- 
standing of the dynamics and consequences of population growth, particu- 
larly with regard to  resource and service demands, is therefore an essential 
ingredient for informed policy-making. 
The Human Settlements and Services Area at IIASA is develo~ine a 
~ ~ 1 D~ 
new research activity that is examining the principal interrelationships 
among population, resources, and growth. As part of the preparatory work 
directed at the design of this activity, IIASA invited a distinguished group 
of scholars t o  Schloss Laxenburg in May to act in an advisory capacity as 
a task force (see Appendix). An earlier draft of this paper was circulated 
among the task force members a month in advance end comments were 
invited. During the meeting itself, the paper served as the starting point 
for discussions. While unfortunately it proved t o  be impossible to  incorpo- 
rate the various comments before this report went to  press, they will be 
taken into account in our subsequent efforts in this research activity. 
Andrei Rogers, Chairman 
Human Settlements and 
Services Area 
June 1977 
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World population in 1975 numbered about 4 billion and exhibited a 
growth rate of just under 2 percent a year. At this rate of growth, the 
world's population would double in about 35 years and would total approxi- 
mately 6.5 billion by the end of this century. 
Roughly 1.6 billion people, 40 percent of the world's population, live 
in urban areas today. At the beginning of the last century, the urban popu- 
lation of the world totaled only 25 million. According to recent United 
Nations estimates, about 3.1 billion people, twice today's urban popula- 
tion, will be living in urban areas by the year 2000. 
Rapid rates of urban demographic and economic growth increase the 
difficulties of providing a population with adequate supplies of food, energy 
employment, social services, and infrastructure. The investment needed 
just to maintain present standards in many rapidly urbanizing countries 
calls for a doubling or tripling of institutional plant within the next 25 
years. 
Scholars and policy-makers often disagree when it comes to evaluating 
the desirability of current rapid rates of urban growth in many parts of the 
globe. Some see this trend as fostering national processes of socioeconomic 
development, particularly in the poorer and rapidly urbanizing countries of 
the Third World; whereas others believe the consequences to  be largely un- 
desirable and argue that such urban growth should be slowed down. 
As part of the search for convincing evidence for or against rapid rates 
of urban growth, this paper sets out three major components of any com- 
plete analysis of human settlement problems: the demographics of rapid 
urbanization and urban growth, their demoeconomic consequences, and the 
level and character of the associated resource-service demands. The demo- 
graphics reveal that very high rates of urban growth are likely to prevail 
only for a limited time, essentially while a national population is in its early 
stages of urbanization. Demoeconomic analyses suggest that urbanization 
policies are likely to be more socially beneficial if their focus is on manag 
ing rapid urban growth and reducing social inequities rather than curtailing 
the flow of migrants to  large cities. This policy perspective leads naturally 
to  an interest in the resource and service demands of rapid urban growth, 
to a concern with the importance of population growth relative to economic 
growth as a generator of increased levels of demand, and to an examination 
of the degree to  which the management problems associated with meeting 
these demands would be eased if urban growth rates were significantly 
reduced. 
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M i g r a t i o n ,  U r b a n i z a t i o n ,  Resources ,  and Development 
WORLD URBANIZATION AND THE PROBLEMS OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from 132 n a t i o n s  assembled i n  Vancouver i n  
June  o f  l a s t  y e a r  t o  convene H a b i t a t ,  t h e  Uni ted  N a t i o n s  Confer-  
e n c e  on Human S e t t l e m e n t s .  The Conference  was a  g l o b a l  i n q u i r y  
i n t o  s o l u t i o n s  o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l  and u r g e n t  problems of  human 
s e t t l e m e n t s  c r e a t e d  by t h e  convergence of two h i s t o r i c  e v e n t s :  
u n p r e c e d e n t e d l y  h i g h  r a t e s  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  growth and mass ive  
r u r a l  t o  urban m i g r a t i o n .  
World p o p u l a t i o n  i n  1975 numbered a b o u t  4 b i l l i o n  and 
e x h i b i t e d  a  growth r a t e  o f  j u s t  under  2 p e r c e n t  a  y e a r .  A t  t h i s  
r a t e  o f  growth t h e  w o r l d ' s  p o p u l a t i o n  would double  i n  a b o u t  35 
y e a r s  and would t o t a l  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  6.5 b i l l i o n  by t h e  end of  
t h i s  c e n t u r y .  
F i g u r e  1 i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  enormous i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  speed  
w i t h  which world p o p u l a t i o n  h a s  grown d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  t h r e e  
c e n t u r i e s .  From t h e  b e g i n n i n g  of  human t i m e  t o  1650 wor ld  popula-  
t i o n  grew t o  a b o u t  h a l f  a  b i l l i o n .  The second h a l f - b i l l i o n  came 
by 1830, and t h e  second b i l l i o n  i n  o n l y  a n o t h e r  100 y e a r s .  I t  
t o o k  j u s t  30 y e a r s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h i s  t o t a l  t o  3  b i l l i o n ,  and t h e  
f o u r t h  b i l l i o n  came a  l i t t l e  o v e r  15 y e a r s  l a t e r .  
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Figure 1.  World population through history. 
Source: Berelson (1974), p. 4 
Urban population growth has been even more explosive 
(Figure 2). Roughly 1.6 billion people, 40 percent of the 
world's population, live in urban areas today. At the beginning 
of the last century, the urban population of the world totaled 
only 25 million. The United Nations estimates are that about 
3.1 billion people, twice today's urban population, will be 
living in urban areas by the year 2000. 
YEAR 
Figure 2. The growth of the world's urban and rural 
populations, 1800- 2000. 
Source: United Nations (1976), p. 3 
Rapid rates of population growth and urbanization occurred 
first among nations that modernized first. Thus, for two thirds 
of the world these rates did not reach significant levels until 
very recently, generally after World War 11. It is convenient, 
therefore, to examine the population situation separately for 
the developed and the less developed parts of the world. 
Urbanization in Developed and Less Developed Countries 
Less than a third of the world's population lives in 
developed parts of the world, defined by the United Nations to 
comprise all of Europe, Northern America, Japan, Temperate 
South America, Australia and New Zealand, and the USSR. 
The rest of the world's people, about 2.9 billion of them, 
live in the economically poorer, less developed parts. 
Birth rates in less developed countries are, on the average, 
about twice as high as those in developed countries. Although 
death rates in the former also exceed those in the latter, the 
gap is smaller and becoming smaller still. The difference 
between births and deaths is natural increase, and rates of 
natural increase in the less developed countries far exceed 
those in the developed ones. Consequently, the less developed 
world has a population growth rate of 2.5 times that of the 
developed (2.4 percent aqainst 0.9 percent); its share of the 
global total is rapidly increasing and is expected to exceed 
three fourths by the year 2000 (Figure 3). 
WORLD WPULATION 
Y E A R  
Figure 3. Population growth of today's developed and 
less developed countries. 
Source: Keyfitz (1976), p. 29 
A large proportion of the population of the less developed 
world is engaged in agriculture. In consequence, a relatively 
small fraction of this population is urban: only about one 
fourth. The corresponding fraction for the developed world is 
close to seven tenths (Figure 4). But because of their much 
larger share of the world's population, less developed countries 
today have as large an urban population as do the developed 
countries: just under four fifths of a billion people each. 
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Figure 4 .  Percentage population urban in 
major world regions. 1970. 
Source: Berelson (1974), p. 14 
Urban p o p u l a t i o n s  a r e  growing much more r a p i d l y  t h a n  t h e  
t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n s  o f  which t h e y  a r e  a  p a r t .  Tab le  1  shows t h a t  
t h i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  i n  t h e  l e s s  deve loped  wor ld .  Between 
1950 and 1970 t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  o f - t h e  deve loped  c o u n t r i e s  
i n c r e a s e d  by 26 p e r c e n t  and t h a t  o f  t h e  l e s s  deve loped  c o u n t r i e s  
by 54 p e r c e n t ;  d u r i n g  t h e  same p e r i o d  t h e  u rban  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  
t h e  fo rmer  grew by 57 p e r c e n t  w h i l e  t h a t  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  i n c r e a s e d  
by o v e r  146 p e r c e n t .  
The l a t e s t  Uni ted N a t i o n s  p r o j e c t i o n s  o f  u rban  popu la -  
t i o n s  up t o  t h e  y e a r  2000 f o r  seven  major  a r e a s  o f  t h e  world  
a r e  g raphed  i n  F i g u r e  5. These a r e  drawn o n  a  l o g a r i t h m i c  s c a l e  
s o  t h a t  p a r a l l e l  s l o p e s  d e p i c t  e q u a l  r a t e s  o f  g rowth .  They 
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  u rban  growth r a t e s  i n  Europe,  Nor the rn  America,  
and t h e  USSR a r e  l i k e l y  t o  s low down t o  modera te  l e v e l s ,  whereas  
t h o s e  o f  E a s t  and Sou th  A s i a ,  L a t i n  America,  and A f r i c a  a r e  
l i k e l y  t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  be  c o m p a r a t i v e l y  h i g h .  Between 1975 and 
t h e  y e a r  2000 t h e  u rban  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  Europe is  l i k e l y  t o  i n -  
c r e a s e  by a  t h i r d ,  t h a t  o f  N o r t h e r n  America and t h e  USSR by h a l f .  
I t  may d o u b l e  i n  E a s t  A s i a ,  t r e b l e  i n  Sou th  A s i a  and A f r i c a ,  and 
grow two-and-a-half - fold  i n  L a t i n  America.  
H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  u rban  growth and u r b a n i z a t i o n  have o c c u r r e d  
t o g e t h e r ,  b u t  t h e y  d o  n o t  measure  t h e  same a t t r i b u t e  o f  n a t i o n a l  
p o p u l a t i o n .  Urban growth r e f e r s  t o  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  number o f  
p e o p l e  l i v i n g  i n  urban s e t t l e m e n t s  and u r b a n i z a t i o n  t o  a  r i s e  
i n  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  a  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  t h a t  i s  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  
u rban  s e t t l e m e n t s .  The l a t t e r  measure ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  a  f u n c t i o n  
n o t  o n l y  o f  urban growth b u t  a l s o  o f  r u r a l  growth ( F i g u r e  6 ) .  
Thus,  u rban  growth can  o c c u r  w i t h o u t  u r b a n i z a t i o n  i f  t h e  r u r a l  
p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  a t  a  r a t e  e q u a l  t o  o r  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h a t  o f  
t h e  u rban  p o p u l a t i o n .  
T a b l e  2  t r a c e s  t h e  u r b a n i z a t i o n  p r o c e s s  i n  t h e  w o r l d ' s  
deve loped  and l e s s  deve loped  r e g i o n s  and i n  e i g h t  o f  i t s  major  
g e o g r a p h i c a l  a r e a s .  I n  s t r i k i n g  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  d i f -  
f e r e n c e s  among u r b a n  growth r a t e s  i n  T a b l e  1  and F i g u r e  5 ,  d i f f e r -  
e n c e s  i n  t h e  r a t e s  o f  u r b a n i z a t i o n  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  minor ,  e x c e p t  i n  
t h r e e  i n s t a n c e s .  The USSR and L a t i n  America e x h i b i t  above-average 
r a t e s  o f  u r b a n i z a t i o n ;  i n  Oceania  t h e  pace  o f  u r b a n i z a t i o n  i s  
below a v e r a g e .  U r b a n i z a t i o n  i n  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  r e g i o n s ,  however,  
i s  p r o c e e d i n g  a t  a  r a t h e r  s i m i l a r  p a c e ,  w i t h  t h e i r  u r b a n  s h a r e s  
i n c r e a s i n g  by a b o u t  0 .5  p e r c e n t  e v e r y  y e a r .  The d i f f e r e n c e s  a r e  
a  consequence o f  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  r a t e s  o f  r u r a l  g rowth .  
The Problems o f  Human S e t t l e m e n t s  
Problems o f  u r b a n i z a t i o n  a r e  problems o f  n a t i o n a l  human s e t -  
t l e m e n t  sys tems :  t h o s e  ne tworks  o f  s p a t i a l l y  d i s p e r s e d  c o n c e n t r a -  
t i o n s  o f  p e o p l e  and economic a c t i v i t i e s .  C i t i e s ,  towns,  and u rban  
a g g l o m e r a t i o n s  a r e  n o d a l  c e n t e r s  o f  l i f e  i n  modern s o c i e t i e s ,  and 
changes  i n  u r b a n i z a t i o n  t r e n d s  a p p e a r  a s  changes  i n  t h e  s p a t i a l  
and h i e r a r c h i c a l l y  s t r u c t u r e d  p a t t e r n s  o f  s u c h  c e n t e r s .  
. e  1 .  P o p u l a t i o n  e s t i m a t e s  and p r o j e c t i o n s  (medium v a r i a n t )  a n d  a v e r a g e  
a n n u a l  r a t e  o f  g rowth :  w o r l d  t o t a l ,  r e g i o n s ,  c o u n t r i e s  o r  a r e a s ,  
u r b a n  and  r u r a l ,  1 9 5 0 - 2 0 0 0 .  
~ i o n s .  countries Tota l :  T 
o r  a r e a s  U r i n n :  U 
m a l :  R 
W3RLD W A L  ............. T 
u 
R 
mm Develcpd 
R e q ~ m  ............. T 
U 
R 
less DwelOped 
............. R e g i m  T 
U 
R 
mu, .................. T 
U 
R 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  m E  T 
U 
R 
rnRIcA, turn .......... T 
U 
R 
.......... rnRIcA, SOLmi T 
U 
R 
RSIA .................... T 
U 
R 
OCEANIA ................. T 
U 
R 
USSR .................... T 
mtal -lation ( i n  t h u s a d s )  and 
m u a l  rate of grcvth  (in percent )  FTs-mT2iT  
- 
3609600 1.9 3967005 2 . 0  4373210 1 . 9  5279041 1 .7  6253135 
1350032 2 .9  1557685 2 .9  1799528 2 . 8  2385646 2 .6  3103214 
2259568 1 . 3  1.3 2573682 1.1 2893395 0 . 9  3149921 
L- 
s o u r c e :  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  ( 1 9 7 6 ) .  pp .  2 2 - U 9  I 
- 
[SNOI l l IW NI)  NOllVlfldOd 

The major problems of urbanization arise because urban 
growth is polarized and spatially imbalanced. Growth does not 
generally occur proportionally at all nodes of a national 
settlement system. Particularly in less developed countries, 
it usually falls unequally on the larger (20,000 or more), and 
often already overcrowded, centers of urban life (Table 3). 
Regional disparities in rates of urban growth are even 
more dramatic at the level of the individual urban settlement. 
Table 4 sets out recent United Nations projections of the growth 
of some of the largest urban centers in the less developed world. 
The size of the population growth multiplier, the urban momentum, 
for some cities is truly awesome. During the 25 years between 
1975 and 2000, Lima, Mexico City, Jakarta, and Teheran all are 
expected to triple their populations; SZo Paulo and Seoul are 
projected to grow by a factor of 2.5; and Addis Ababa, Nairobi, 
Lagos, and Kinshasa are to increase four-fold. 
As with rapid population growth in general, rapid urban 
growth increases the difficulties of providing a population with 
the necessary sustenance, employment, services, and infrastruc- 
ture. A rapidly burgeoning urban population strains health and 
education budgets, complicates the reduction of unemployment 
levels, and exacerbates problems connected with provision of 
adequate housing, food, energy supplies, transport, water, and 
sanitary facilities. The "demographic investment" needed just 
to maintain present standards in many rapidly urbanizing areas 
means a doubling or tripling of institutional plant within the 
next 25 years. That these areas are to be found mostly in coun- 
tries least able to afford such an investment only multiplies 
the difficulties associated with the resolution of human settle- 
ment problems. 
The magnitude of the accumulating demands for services and 
infrastructure in less developed countries may be illustrated 
with data on the provision of housing. According to the 1965 
United Nations estimates (Table 5) the less developed regions 
of Africa, Asia, and Latin America required the construction of 
392 million housing units during the 15-year period 1960-1975, 
almost three fourths of them in Asia. This means that an annual 
average of 19.4 million housing units needed to be built to 
satisfy demands arising from population increase, replacement 
of obsolescent stock, and elimination of existing shortages. 
Translated into per capita terms, the estimated requirement for 
this region is about 1 1  units per 1000 population. Available 
statistics indicate that in most countries of Asia less than 
two housing units per 1000 population were built each year 
during the 1960s (Mok, 1975, p. 98). 
Rapid rates of urban population growth are but one cause 
of the increase in total demand. Increased consumption arising 
out of a growing per capita income also plays an important role. 
Continued urban growth at an annual rate of 4 to 5 percent, 
accompanied by a growth rate of urban per capita income of a 
similar level, means an annual growth rate of total urban income 
and demand for goods and services of about 9 percent. Compounded 
over the 30 years from 1970 to the end of this century, such a 
rate leads to a 13-fold increase in throughput of materials and 
services. 
This rate of increase is hard to comprehend. 
It means, for example, that the metropolitan 
area of Mexico City, which in 1970 generated 
about $8 billion in total income (assuming 
that per capita income was $1,000 and popula- 
tion 8 million), would have a total income 
of $104 billion in the year 2000. This 
figure is greater than the total income today 
of any country in the world with the exception 
of the United States, the Soviet Union, West 
Germany, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom. 
(Ridker and Crosson, 1975, p. 217.) 
An examination of the prospects for world population 
growth and urbanization reveals very forcefully that the twin 
historical developments that have created the problems of today's 
human settlements will continue for the rest of this century 
and beyond in most parts of the world. The rate of world 
population growth, though apparently declining, will still be 
considerable for some time to come, and rural-urban migration 
shows no signs of abating in most of the less developed world. 
Therefore, the number of people in the world will continue to 
increase in the near future, as will the proportion of people 
living in urban settlements. Populations in urban centers will 
continue to grow at an alarming rate, particularly in the larger 
urban agglomerations of the less developed world. The problems 
created by this transformation are manifold and involve large 
private and social costs. But there are obvious benefits too, 
and it is important to keep these in mind when considering 
policies for intervening in the urbanization process. A better 
understanding of the dynamics and consequences of urban-rural 
population growth and economic development appears to be an 
essential ingredient of such considerations, and this requires 
a focus on the processes of change together with their manifesta- 
tions. In the remainder of this paper, we turn to such an 
examination. 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
Accelerated rates of population growth and urbanization 
are direct consequences of higher rates of natural increase 
(births minus deaths) and of net urban migration (urban inmigra- 
tion minus urban outmigration). Explanations of temporal and 
spatial variations in the patterns exhibited by these two sets 
of rates generally have taken the form of descriptive generaliza- 
tions phrased in terms of "transitions" or "revolutions". 
. . 
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Tab le  4. Popu la t i on  e s t i m a t e s  and p r o j e c t i o n s  f o r  f i f t e e n  
l a r g e  c i t i e s .  
Source:  United Nat ions  (1936), pp. 77-83 
Multiple increase over 
base year 
1950-1975 1975-2000 
City 
Cairo, Egypt 2.4 6.9 16.4 2.9 2.4 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 0.2 1.1 4.2 4.8 3.9 
Nairobi, Kenya 0.1 0.7 3.4 5.5 4.5 
Lagos, Nigeria 2.9 2.1 9.4 7.2 4.6 
Kinshasa, Zaire 0.2 2.0 9.1 12.5 4.4 
Mexim City, Mexico 2.9 10.9 31.6 3.8 2.9 
S ~ O  Paulo, Brazil 2.4 10.0 26.0 4.1 2.6 
Bogota, Colombia 0.7 3.4 9.5 5.2 2.8 
Guayaquil, Ecuador 0.3 1.0 3.1 4.0 3.1 
Lima, Peru 0.6 3.9 12.1 6.4 3.1 
Jakarta, Indonesia .I -6 5.6 16.9 3.6 3.0 
Teheran, Iran 1 .O 4.4 13.8 4.3 3.1 
Seoul, Korea 1.0 7.3 18.7 7.1 2.6 
Karachi, Pakistan 1.0 4.5 15.9 4.3 3.6 
Bangkok, Thailand 1.0 3.3 11.0 3.4 3.4 
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~ ~ e c i f l c a l l ~ ,  the v i t a l  r e v o l u t i o n  is c~mmonly held to be the 
process whereby societies with high birth and death rates move 
to low birth and death rates. The m o b i l i t y  r e v o l u t i o n  is the 
transformation experienced by societies with low migration rates 
as they advance to high migration rates. These two revolutions 
occur simultaneously and jointly constitute the d ~ m o g r a p h i c  
t r a n s i t i o n .  
The Vital Revolution 
As traditional, largely illiterate, rural and agricultural- 
based populations have become transformed into modern, largely 
literate, urban, industrial-service-dominated societies, they 
have moved from high levels to low levels of mortality and 
fertility. The belief that such a transition inevitably follows 
modernization has fostered the now often-voiced view that 
"development is the best contraceptive". 
The general description of the vital revolution was 
originally developed some fifty years ago as an explanation 
of the demographic experiences of 19th century Europe. This 
revolution begins with the control of deaths. Improvements in 
health care, in sanitation, in general standards of living, in 
nutrition, and in personal cleanliness act to postpone death and 
to reduce mortality rates. 
Control over deaths is followed, after some lag, by control 
over births. The principal factor in the reduction of the birth 
rate appears to be the voluntary regulation of fertility. The 
lag between the onset of mortality decline and that of fertility 
decline creates an asymmetry that leads to rapid population growth 
due to natural increase (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7 .  The vital revolution in developed countries. 
Source: Berelson (1974), p. 6 
The changes in fertility and mortality that constitute the 
vital revolution are more readily understood if the developed 
and the less developed countries of the world are considered 
separately. The birth rate in the less developed world in 1 9 6 0  
was approximately 42.8 per 1000 ,  while the rate in the developed 
world was half that (Table 6 ) .  The death rate in the less 
developed regions also was higher than that of the developed 
regions, but the difference was roughly half of that between 
the two birth rates. As a result, the population of the devel- 
oped countries in 1 9 6 0  was growing at a rate of 1 2 . 5  per 1000 ,  
whereas that of the less developed countries was growing at the 
rate of 2 2 . 5  per 1000 .  
Because of their much higher fertility, less developed 
nations have a much "younger" age composition than developed 
countries and therefore a far greater built-in tendency for 
further growth. A country with a recent history of high birth 
rates, such as Mexico, for example, exhibits an age pyramid with 
a broad base that tapers off sharply at the older age groups. 
On the other hand, a country with a history of low birth rates, 
such as Sweden, has an age composition that yields an almost 
rectangular age pyramid (Figure 8 ) .  
Populations in which children outnumber ~arents potentially 
have a larger number of parents in the next generation than today 
and therefore acquire a built-in momentum for further growth, 
even if their fertility immediately drops to bare replacement 
level. Bare replacement level under conditions of modern mortality 
means that each family reduces its fertility to about 2 .1  to 
2 .3  children on the average. If average family size in develop- 
ing countries dropped to bare replacement immediately, this would 
produce a zero growth population only after 8 0  years or more, 
and that population would be about two thirds larger than the 
current one (Figure 9 ) .  If the drop were to take abcut 7 0  
years to achieve, this increase would be 450  percent. In 
other words, the momentum with the immediate fertility decline 
is about one and two thirds, and with delayed decline about five 
and a half. 
Populations in all developed countries have gone through 
a process of demographic change in which a decline in mortality 
eventually was followed by a drop in fertility. Demographers 
refer to this transformation as the demographic transition and 
associate it with socioeconomic changes that arise during a 
nation's industrialization and modernization. Although the 
process has been far from uniform, and its linkages with 
changes in socioeconomic variables have not been clearly 
identified, the universality of this revolution in developed 
countries is nevertheless quite impressive. 
The vital revolution deals only with vital rates and 
neglects internal displacements attributable to migration. 
The latter contributor to spatial demographic change also 
exhibits a historical pattern--one that is described by the 
generalization known as the m o b i l i t y  r e v o l u t i o n .  
Table 6. Component rates of population growth: world total 
and regions, 1960. 
R e g i o n s  
T o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n :  
WORLD 1 9 . 2  
More  d e ~ e l o p e d  
r e g i o n s  1 2 . 5  
L e s s  d e v e l o p e d  
r e g i o n s  2 2 . 5  
AFRICA 2 2 . 9  
W e s t e r n  A f r i c a  2 2 . 8  
E a s t e r n  A f r i c a  2 2 .  3  
N o r t h e r n  A f r i c a  2 5 . 7  
M l d d l e  A f r i c a  1 8 . 2  
S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a  2 3 . 1  
NORTHERN AMERICA 1 6 . 5  
LATIN AMERICA 2 8 . 0  
T r o p i c a l  S o u t h  
A m e r i c a  2 9 . 3  
M i d d l e  A m e r i c a  
( M a i n l a n d )  3 2 . 6  
T e m p e r a t e  S o u t h  
A m e r i c a  1 8 . 9  
C a r i b b e a r .  2 2 . 2  
EAST ASIA 17.11 
C h i n a  1 7 . 7  
. J apan  9 . 6  
O t h e r  E a s t  A s i a  2 8 . 7  
SOUTH ASIA 2 3 . 9  
M i d d l e  S o u t h  A s i a  2 3 . 0  
S o u t h  E a s t  A s i a  2 5 . 6  
S o u t h  West A s i a  27 .  3  
EUROPE 8 . 8  
W e s t e r n  E u r o p e  11 .4  
S o u t h e r n  E u r o p e  8 . 2  
E a s t e r n  E u r o p e  7 . 4  
N o r t h e r n  E u r o p e  6 . 4  
OCEAN1 4 2 1 . 7  
-
A u s t r a l l a  a n d  New 
Z e a l a n d  2 0 . 9  
M e l a n e s i a  2 3 . 0  
M i c r o n e s i a  a n d  
P o l y n e s i a  2 9 . 1  
USSR 1 6 . 2  
-
S o u r c e :  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  P. 30  
MEXICO (1970) SWEDEN (1970) 
FEMALE 
PERCENT 
ALE 
4 2 0 2 4  
PERCENT 
Figure 8. Y our~g and old population age compositions. 
Source: tierelson (1974), p.  12 
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The Mobility Revolution 
The primarily t empora l  aspect of the v i t a l  revolution has 
a s p a t i a l  counterpart that Zelinsky has called the m o b i l i t y  
transition or revolution, describing it in the following terms: 
There are definite, patterned regularities 
in the growth of personal mobility through 
space-time during recent history, and these 
regularities comprise an essential compo- 
nent of the modernization process .... A 
transition from a...condition of severely 
limited physical and social mobility toward 
much higher rates of such movement always 
occurs as a community experiences the 
process of modernization. (Zelinsky, 
1971, pp. 2 2 1 - 2 2 2 . )  
Zelinsky's hypothesis is that for any specific community 
the vital and the mobility revolutions follow a parallel. tran- 
sitional sequence. He argues that, as man has extended his 
control first over deaths and then over births, he also has 
increased his ability to move from one community to another. 
Thus, whereas in premodern societies opportunities for territorial 
movement were limited, in most modern societies many individuals 
can migrate without major difficulties. The transition from the 
premodern to the modern condition is the mobility revolution, 
and its three principal phases* appear to be: 
1. Premodern Society: High fertility and mortality, low 
natural increase, and little geographical mobility. 
2. Transitional Society: A decline in mortality in the 
early stages of this phase, followed, after a lag, by 
a corresponding decline in fertility: the lag produces 
a rapid increase in population, accompanied by massive 
rural to urban migration which gradually rises to a 
peak and then slackens. 
3. Modern Society: Low fertility and mortality; vigorous 
urban to urban migration and intraurban commuting; 
net rural to urban migration declines, even taking on 
negative values as the population increasingly shifts 
outward from metropolitan agglomerations toward smaller 
communities. 
*This three-way division essentially collapses Zelinsky's five 
phases. The first is his premodern traditional society; the 
second combines his early and late transitional societies; and 
the third represents his advanced and superadvanced societies. 
In the premodern traditional societies of medieval Europe, 
early 19th century Japan, and most of pre-World-War-I1 Asia and 
Africa, individually motivated migration over substantial 
distances was rather uncommon. Difficulties of long-distance 
transportation, low levels of communication between distant 
localities, minimal disposable per capita incomes, and strong 
social ties all contributed toward the evolution of communities 
whose demographic growth was relatively undisturbed by migration. 
Such societies were in Phase 1 of the mobility revolution. 
Phase 2 begins with the onset of industrialization and 
modernization. Physical and social barriers to internal migra- 
tion decline, and the incentives for territorial movement increase 
Rapidly growing rural populations experiencing the second phase 
of the vital revolution, combined with structural changes in the 
technology of agricultural production, impel increasing numbers 
of individuals to migrate in search of improved social and 
economic opportunities. This geographical shift is directed 
mostly toward the larger urban centers. 
During the final phase of the mobility revolution urban to 
urban migration and commuting are the predominant forms of 
territorial movement. Rural to urban migration declines; but 
the ass~ciated decrement in rural population may be more than 
offset by the size of the reverse flow. This late stage of 
Phase 3 has been called "counterurbanization", and it appears to 
be occurring today in the USA, in Sweden, and in the FRG 
(Morrison and Wheeler, 1976). 
The hypothesis that rates of internal migration rise in 
the course of national socioeconomic development has been 
proposed on several occasions and has received empirical support 
in a number of studies (e.g., Zelinksi, 1971; Parish, 1973; and 
Long and Boertlein, 1976). Residential mobility in Japan, for 
example, has increased from a one-year rate of 9.5 percent in 
1960 to 12.8 percent in 1970. Kuroda (1973) reports a parallel 
rise in Japan's interdistrict migration rate, from about 5.8 
percent in the early 1950s to about 8.0 percent in 1970. 
A simple plot of these rates against per capita income as a 
proxy for development and modernization suggests a decidedly 
positive association. 
Data for nations in the late stages of modernization 
indicate that rates of geographical mobility ultimately tend 
to stabilize and perhaps even decline. For example, annual 
migration data for the USA between 1948 and 1971 exhibit 
insignificant year-to-year variations in the rate of residen- 
tial mobility (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976). Figure 10 
shows that a slight decline may have occurred in the USA 
during the decade 1960-70. 
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Figure 10. Residential mobility rate in six countries 
around 1970 (and 1960 where so identified). 
Source: L.H. Long and C.G. Boertlein (1976), pp. 3 and 17 
Rising income and declining family size give households 
more freedom to move. Thus increased economic development and 
reduced fertility levels should raise rates of internal migra- 
tion. But other factors push in the reverse direction. 
Economic development stimulates the labor force participation 
of wives, and working wives reduce the ease with which couples 
can relocate. Low fertility populations have a rather high 
proportion of the aged, whose rates of migration are low. 
This compositional effect acts to reduce aggregate movement 
rates. The gradual reduction of regional differentials in well- 
being that seem to follow modernization dampens some of the 
stimulus for migration. Finally, the greater ease of access 
characteristic of modern societies allows people to increasingly 
substitute commuting for migration. 
The transitional society of Phase 2 of the mobility 
revolution experiences the particular form of population re- 
distribution that is urbanization. As Kingsley Davis has 
observed, this is a new and relatively recent step in the social 
evolution of human society. 
Although cities themselves first appeared 
some 5,500 years ago, ... before 1850 no 
society could be described as predominantly 
urbanized, and by 1900 only one--Great 
Britain--would be so regarded. Today, ... 
all industrial nations are highly urbanized, 
and in the world as a whole the process of 
urbanization is accelerating rapidly. 
(Davis, 1965, pp. 41-53.) 
Urbanization is a finite process all nations go through 
in their transition from an agrarian to an industrial society. 
Such urbanization transitions can be depicted by attenuated 
S-shaped curves (Figure 1 1 ) .  These tend to show a swift rise 
around 20 percent, a flattening out at a point somewhere between 
40 and 60 percent, and a halt or even a decline in the proportion 
urban at levels above 75 percent. 
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Sourc.~: I)rlvis (1065). p. 47 
Nations that are still predominantly agricultural and 
rural have a built-in tendency for continued urbanization. 
This "urbanization momentum" is the spatial counterpart of 
the growth momentum that was described as part of the vital 
revolution. In most instances the size of the former is 
considerably larger than that of the latter. Figure 12 
documents this for the case of India today. The principal 
spatial dynamics that contribute to such urbanization ~omenta 
are examined next. 
The Demographics of Urbanization 
Urbanization results from a particular spatial interaction 
of the vital and the mobility revolutions. It is characterized 
by distinct urban-rural differentials in fertility-mortality 
levels and patterns of decline, and by a massive net transfer of 
population from rural to urban areas through internal migration. 
INDIA URBAN INDIA 
0 L ~ 2  
1975 - ZPG 
O C  _ -  . - 1 
1975 ZPG 
- IMMEDIATE FERTILITY - IMMEDIATE FERTILITY 
DECLINE DECLINE ALTERNATIVES 
--- GRADUAL FERTILITY --- GRADUAL FERTILITY 
DECLINE DECLINE ALTERNATIVES 
F i g ~ r e  12. Urbanization momenta of India's population. 
Sourer: Kogrrs and Willekens (1976), p. 32 
The few theoretical statements that have sought to explain 
the urbanization process seem to concur that this social 
phenomenon generally evolves physically in the following sequence 
(e.g., Gibbs, 1963) : 
1. During the initial period of city formation the rate 
of urban growth is exceeded by the rate of rural growth. 
2. At some point in the history of the nation or region, 
a reversal occurs and the urban growth rate outstrips 
the rate of increase of the rural population, thereby 
initiating the growth of urbanization. 
3. Eventually a "turning point" is reached as the proportion 
of the population that is urban exceeds 50 percent for 
the first time. 
4. With the continuous decline in agriculture's share of 
the total labor force, the rural population ceases 
to grow and begins to decline in number. 
5. In the late stages of industrialization, a decentraliza- 
tion of urban population occurs within urban centers 
and beyond, producing a more dispersed spatial pattern 
of population. In some instances rural (non-farm) 
growth overtakes and once again exceeds urban growth. 
Figure 13 illustrates the path followed by urban and rural 
growth rates in the USA as the nation was transformed from a 
5 percent urban population in 1790 to a 70 percent urban popula- 
tion in 1960. By 1790, the nation was already in the second stage 
of the above sequence, reaching the "turning point" just before 
1920 and entering the fourth stage in the late 1940s. It 
currently is well into the fifth stage and recently has experi- 
enced the second reversal in growth rates: rural growth rates 
once again are higher than urban (Morrison and Wheeler, 1976). 
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The pattern illustrated in Figure 13 for the USA seems to 
have some generality and apparently has also occurred in other 
countries, such as the USSR: 
After more than a century of rising rates 
of increase in the urban population, from 
an average of 1.3 per cent per annum early 
in the 19th century to 6.5 per cent per 
annum average for the period between the 
censuses of 1926 and 1939, the Soviet 
Union is now experiencing declining growth 
rates. The highest rates of urban growth 
were achieved ... when the proportion of 
urban population was still low . . .  the peak 
was reached in 1938 with an increase of 
12.2 per cent in one year ... But the long- 
range trend has been downward with average 
annual increases of 4.1 per cent, 1950- 
1959, and 2.8 per cent, 1959-1970. A 
study of individual years, reveals a drop 
from 4.6 per cent in 1958 to 2.3 per cent 
in 1969, or a decline of one-half in a 
dozen years. (Harris, 1975, p. 77.) 
If urbanization is a finite process, what are the spatial 
population dynamics that underlie it? How do urban and rural 
birth, death, and migration rates vary over time to produce 
the paths taken by urban and rural growth rates in countries 
such as the United States? We shall examine the three compo- 
nents of population change in turn, starting with mortality. 
Since the necessary data are very scarce and, in many instances, 
nonexistent, much of our discussion must necessarily be 
speculative. 
Factors affecting mortality are likely to differ between 
urban and rural areas. Health care facilities, for example, 
are more readily available in urban areas. The number of deaths 
attributed to contagious diseases or automobile accidents, on 
the other hand, is apt to be lower in rural areas. On balance, 
it appears that post-1930 rural mortality exceeds urban 
mortality, although in developed countries the differences have 
been narrowed considerably (Table 7). A recent United Nations 
calculation estimates the urban death rate around 1960 to have 
been "almost 8 points less than the rural in Africa, about 6 
points less in East Asia and South Asia, and considerably less 
also in Oceania; in Europe and Northern America, on the other 
hand, the difference, if any, could have been only slight." 
(United Nations, 1974, pp. 17-18.) 
The fertility of urban women is lower than that of rural 
women virtually everywhere (Table 7). The principal factors 
associated with lowered birth rates, such as education, income, 
labor force participation of women, age at marriage, all are 
correlates of urbanization. Thus fertility decline has tended 
to spread from city to village and from village to farm. United 
Nations estimates of urban and rural crude birth rates around 
1960 revealed that "the urban crude birth rate was in general 
considerably below the rural crude birth rate. Only in Northern 
America was the difference rather slight. In Europe, the rural 
birth rate exceeded the urban by 4 points, in East Asia and South 
Asia by about 7 points, in Latin America by 9 points, and in 
Oceania by 14 points." (United Nations, 1974, p. 18.) 
Table 7. Component rates of urban and rural population growth: 
world t.otal and regions, 1960. 
W 33.0 - 27.7 -- 11.6 12.5 - 39.8 - 19.1 
- 
W r e  developed regions 23.5 20.1 8.9 -2.6 23.3 9 .3  
Less developed regions 45.5 37.9 15.4 16.5 44.1 21.7 
ma 
Western AErlca 
Eastern Afrlca 
Wrthern Africa 
Middle Africa 
r. Mcro  regums ,  regions,  
arban anl r u r a l  
-- 
Southern Africa 32.9 32.1 15.1 16.3 47.6 20.1 
Urbivl Population Rural Population 
G m t h  
r a t e  
LnTIN AmRICA 44.6 - 35.1 - 10.8 12.7 - 44.2 - 12.6 
- - 
Tropical  South Rmerica 49.6 31.1 11.2 11.7 45.0 12.8 
Middle Rmerica (Mainland) 47.0 42.7 11.5 21.1 47.0 13.0 
T a p 2 r a t e  South Prnerica 30.2 24.3 9.1 -9.1 34.3 9.5 
Caribbean 34.2 30.8 11.3 15.1 41.9 12.9 
G2 1-7 1 7 Birth r a t e  bu 
E"wr ASIA 
&?a 
J a w  
Death 
r a t e  
pp
Other East Asla 56.2 35.8 9.0 14.9 43.3 13.6 
m ASIA 
m d d l e  South Asia 
south East  Asla 
South W s t  Asia 
EIJFOPE 
Western Europe 
Southern Europe  
Eastern 
Northern Europe  
UXWIA 26.2 - 22.5 8.9 13.2 -- 36.3 - 13.1 
- - -
Aust ra l i a  and NRI Zedard  25.8 22.2 8.9 1 .8 29.0 7.5 
Melanesia 47.9 45.8 13.8 22.4 42.7 19.8 
Micronesia ard Polynesia 47.6 35.5 9.1 25.8 42.6 12.9 
USSR 34.5 - 20.8 6.5 
- - 
-1.4 - 
 
26.5 8.4 
- 
- 
S o u r c e :  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  ( 1 9 7 6 ) .  pp.  5 1 - 5 2  
The d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  b i r t h  r a t e  and t h e  d e a t h  r a t e  
i s  n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e ,  and r u r a l  n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e  exceeds  u rban  
n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  most p a r t s  o f  t h e  w o r l d  ( T a b l e  7 ) .  Yet 
u rban  a r e a s  have been growing much more r a p i d l y  t h a n  r u r a l  a r e a s .  
C l e a r l y ,  t h e  component o f  change f o s t e r i n g  t h i s  growth i s  
m i g r a t i o n .  
The u rban  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  USSR was growing a t  a n  a n n u a l  
r a t e  o f  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  2 .5  p e r c e n t  d u r i n g  t h e  e a r l y  1970s.  A t  
t h e  same t i m e ,  i t s  r u r a l  p o p u l a t i o n  was d e c l i n i n g  a t  a n  a n n u a l  
r a t e  o f  1.1 p e r c e n t .  The u rban  growth r a t e  was t h e  sum o f  a  r a t e  
o f  n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e  o f  0.9 and a  n e t  m i g r a t i o n  r a t e  o f  1.6 
p e r c e n t .  The u rban  r a t e  o f  n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e ,  i n  t u r n ,  was t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  between a  b i r t h  r a t e  o f  17 p e r  1000 and a  d e a t h  r a t e  
o f  8 p e r  1000. The n e t  m i g r a t i o n  r a t e  was t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
an i n m i g r a t i o n  r a t e  o f  27 p e r  1000 and a n  o u t m i g r a t i o n  r a t e  o f  
11 p e r  1000. E x p r e s s i n g  t h e s e  r a t e s  on a  p e r  c a p i t a  b a s i s ,  w e  
have t h e  fundamenta l  a c c o u n t i n g  i d e n t i t y  (Rogers ,  1 9 7 6 ) :  
The c o r r e s p o n d i n g  i d e n t i t y  f o r  t h e  r u r a l  p o p u l a t i o n  was 
W e  may c o n t r a s t  t h e  above d a t a  f o r  t h e  USSR, which is 
a b o u t  56 p e r c e n t  u r b a n ,  w i t h  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  d a t a  f o r  I n d i a ,  which 
i s  o n l y  20 p e r c e n t  u rban .  The two a c c o u n t i n g  i d e n t i t i e s  f o r  
I n d i a  i n  t h e  l a t e  1960s w e r e ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y  (Rogers  and 
W i l l e k e n s ,  1 9 7 6 ) :  
and 
Observe that the outmigration rates from urban areas in 
the two countries are almost identical (0.011 and 0.010), and 
that in India the rural outmigration rate is l o w e r  than the urban 
outmigration rate. This at first glance seems to contradict the 
view of a massive net transfer of people from rural to urban 
areas, but a closer examination of the fundamental accounting 
identity in Equation 1 readily shows that no such contradiction 
exists. 
Return migration and the much larger base population in 
rural India together account for much of the observed out- 
migration from urban areas. To see this more clearly we may 
rewrite Equation 1 as 
where U is the fraction of the population that is urban. 
Since India's population is about 20 percent urban and or is 
0.007 we find that 
which is what we had in Equation 3 (except for a unit difference 
in the third decimal place due to rounding). 
Equation 5 may be rearranged to give 
a relationship which reveals that so long as U is small o 
u is likely to be large. Thus, for India, we have that 
whereas the corresponding data for the USSR give 
Curiously, both sets of data yield nearly identical values for 
o a n d n  - r  * 
u u u- 
*(Footnote next page.) 
ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS OF URBANIZATION 
In a now classic analysis of the demoeconomic consequences 
of fertility reduction, Ansley Coale (1969) examined some of the 
ways in which the population characteristics of less developed coun- 
tries are related to their poverty and how alternative demographic 
trends might affect their modernization. Coale focused on nations 
rather than regions within nations and consequently could ignore 
population gains or losses arising through migration. Moreover, 
he assumed that widespread famine could be averted, at least in 
the short run, and therefore posited only a single future course 
for mortality--a reduction that could be achieved and maintained. 
Thus fertility was left as the sole population change variable 
considered to be responsive to governmental policy. 
We shall be concerned here with the implications, 
for the growth in per capita income and for the 
provision of productive employment, of alternative 
possible future courses of fertility. The 
specific alternatives to be considered are the 
maintenance of fertility at its current level 
and, as the contrasting alternative, a rapid 
reduction in fertility, amounting to fifty 
per cent of the initial level and occupying a 
transitional period of about twenty-five years. 
(Coale, 1969, p. 63.) 
After generating the two alternative projections or 
"scenarios", Coale went on to 
*This near equivalence suggests the potentially more useful 
alternative rearrangement of Equation 5: 
In both the USSR and India the quantity in square brackets is 
0.027. When this quantity may be assumed to be approximately 
fixed (which is likely to hold only for countries not yet over 
60 percent urban), one can crudely estimate the rural to urban 
-- 
u 
migration rate to be about 0.027 n, . This would give IIexico, 
for example, which in 1970 was roughly 59 percent urban, a rural 
to urban migration rate of 0.039. With a birth rate of 44 per 
1000 and a death rate of 10 per 1000, Mexico's urban population 
should then have been increasing at an annual rate of approximately 
7.3 percent per annum. The reported rate for the 1950-1960 
decade was 7.8 percent (Table 3) . 
... inquire what effects these contrasting 
trends in fertility would have on three 
important population characteristics: 
first, the burden of dependency, defined 
as the total number of persons in the 
population divided by the number in the 
labor force ages (fifteen to sixty-four); 
second, the rate of growth of the labor 
force, or, more precisely, the annual 
per cent rate of increase of the population 
fifteen to sixty-four; and third, the 
density of the population, or, more 
precisely, the number of persons at labor 
force age relative to land area and other 
resources. Then we shall consider how 
these three characteristics of dependency, 
rate of growth, and density influence the 
increase in per capita income. (Coale, 
1969, p. 63.) 
In this section of our paper we shall adopt Coale's scenario- 
building approach to focus on some of the demoeconomic conse- 
quences of rapid urbanization. Because this requires a view of 
urban and rural regions with interacting populations, we cannot 
ignore the impact of migration. We begin by describing the 
construction and evolution of four alternative population 
scenarios and then examine the implications that these 
alternative trends in migration and fertility would have for 
Coale's three important population characteristics: the 
dependency burden, the growth rate of labor force "eligibles", 
and the density of the population. 
The Dynamics of Urbanization: Four Scenarios 
Multiregional population projections translate assumptions 
about future trends in mortality, fertility, and migration with 
respect to a specific initial population into numerical estimates 
of the future size, age composition, and spatial distribution of 
that population. Tables 8 and 9 present several such illustrative 
projections. As in the Coale paper, a hypothetical initial 
population of one million with an age composition and fertility- 
mortality rates typical of a Latin American country is projected 
150 years into the future. To his two alternative projections 
(A, fertility unchanged, and B, fertility reduced), however, 
we have added two others by varying our assumptions on internal 
migration (a, migration unchanged, and b, migration increased). 
This gives the following four possible combinations: 
unchanged increased 
Projection Aa 
unchanged Projection Ab 
Projection Ba 
reduced Pro j ection Bb 
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Table 9. Alternative projections of the population of a less 
developed country: migration increased.* 
A .  F e r t i l i t y  Unchanoed 
P o p u l a t i o n  ( i n  t h o u s a n d s )  
/ Projec t ion  ?b Y e a r  0 10 20 30 40 50 60 150 
0-14 89. 174. 356. 667. 1161. 1940. 2958. 75126. 
15-64 104. 193. 375. 710. 1270. 2128. 3293. 85388. 
I 6% 7. 24. 44. 84. 157. 5146. - - 9. ~- l u . - - -  Tota l  200. 376. 745. 1402. 2475. 4152. 6408. 165661. 
65+ 29. - 28. 37. - 53. - 71. - 84. p- 108. 2. 
- -- -
Tota l  800. 1018. 1276. 1554. 1852. 2164. 2764. 94384. I 
F ' e r t i l i t v  Reduced 
P o p u l a t i o n  ( i n  t h o u s a n d s )  
m o j e c t i o n  Bb Year (O-  0 10 20 30 40 50 60 150 1 
0-14 89. 150. 
W 15-64 104. 193. 
65+ 
- - 
9. 7. -
Tota l  200. 352. 
0-14 394. 435. 
RURAL 15-64 378. 508. 
6% 29. 
-- 
28. 
-
Tota l  800. 971. 
'column v a l u e s  d o  n o t  a l w a y s  sum e x a c t l y  t o  q i v e n  t o t a l s  b e c a u s e  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  r o u n d i n g .  
Coale's assumptions on initial and future patterns of 
mortality and fertility were a crude birth rate of about 
44 per 1000 and a crude death rate of 14 per 1000, giving rise 
to a population growing at 3 percent per year. Starting with 
an expectation of life at birth of approximately 53 years, he 
assumes that during the next 30 years it will rise to about 70 
years, at which point no further improvement will occur. In 
Coale's Projection A current age-specific rates of childbearing 
are fixed for 150 years; in Projection B they are reduced by 
2 percent each year for 25 years (reducing fertility to half of 
its initial level), at which point they too are fixed for the 
remainder of the projection period. 
For our four urbanization scenarios we have spatially 
disaggregated Coale's data and assumptions in the following 
manner. Twenty percent of the initial population of a million 
is taken to be urban. The initial values for birth and death 
rates are assumed to be lower in urban areas than in rural areas 
(40 against 45 per 1000 for the birth rate, and 1 1  against 15 
per 1000 for the death rate). Mortality and fertility are 
reduced as in the Coale projections, but the declines are assumed 
to occur 10 years sooner in urban areas (25 instead of 35 years 
for the decline in mortality, and 20 instead of 30 years for the 
decline in fertility). 
A multiregional population projection also requires 
specification of the initial values and future course of 
internal migration (see Rogers, 1975). To generate the four 
scenarios, initial rates of outmigration were set equal to those 
prevailing in India in 1960 (Bose, 1973); that is, a crude 
outmigration rate from urban areas of 10 per 1000 and a correspond- 
ing rate from rural areas of 7 per 1000. The age-specific rates 
of outmigration from urban areas are held fixed in all four 
projections, as are the corresponding rates from rural areas 
in the two "a" projections. Outmigration from rural areas in 
the two "b" projections, however, is assumed to increase six- 
fold over a period of 50 years and then to drop to half its peak 
value over the following 30 years, after which it is held 
unchanged for the remaining 70 years of the projection period 
(Figure 14) . 
Table 10 lists the principal parametric assumptions that 
generated Coale's two illustrative projections and contrasts 
them with those that produced the four scenarios summarized in 
Tables 8 and 9. The assumptions appear to be reasonable in 
that the hypothetical urbanization paths they chart are plausible. 
For example, the percentage-urban paths for the "b" projections 
in Figure 15 resemble the general shape of the observed 
urbanization paths set out in Figure 11, and Figure 16 shows 
that the trajectories of urban and rural growth rates for these 
projections are in general similar to those exhibited by the 
US data graphed in Figure 13. 
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As i n  C o a l e ' s  s c e n a r i o s ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  p o p u l a t i o n  a n d  t h e  
f u t u r e  r e g i m e  o f  v . o r t a l i t y  a r e  t h e  same f o r  a l l  o f  t h e  f o u r  
p o p u l a t i o n  p r o j e c t i o n s  summarized i n  T a b l e s  8 a n d  9 .  The 
m a j o r  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  d r o p  i n  f e r t i l i t y  a p p e a r s  i n  t h e  p r o j e c t e d  
t o t a l s :  t h e  "A" p r o j e c t i o n  t o t a l s  a r e  a b o u t  2 4  t i m e s  a s  l a r g e  
a s  t h e  "B" p r o j e c t i o n  t o t a l s  a f t e r  150 y e a r s .  M i g r a t i o n ' s  
i m p a c t ,  on  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  a p p e a r s  p r i n c i p a l l y  i n  t h e  s p a t i a l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e s e  t o t a l s :  t h e  " a "  p r o j e c t i o n s  a l l o c a t e  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  a  t h i r d  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  p o p u l a t i o n  t o  u r b a n  a r e a s  
a f t e r  150 y e a r s ,  w h e r e a s  t h e  "b"  p r o j e c t i o n s  d o u b l e  t h i s  s h a r e .  
R e c e n t l y  p u b l i s h e d  s t a t i s t i c s  show p o p u l a t i o n  d e c l i n e s  i n  
t h e  l a r g e r  m e t r o p o l i t a n  r e g i o n s  o f  many m a j o r  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  
n a t i o n s  ( V i n i n g  a n d  K o n t u l y ,  1 9 7 7 ) .  I n  t h e  US, f o r  example ,  
n e t  m i g r a t i o n  i n t o  m e t r o p o l i t a n  a r e a s  h a s  b e e n  n e g a t i v e  s i n c e  
t h e  e a r l y  1970s .  Thus ,  w h e r e a s  t h e  a v e r a g e  a n n u a l  g rowth  r a t e  
o f  m e t r o p o l i t a n  p o p u l a t i o n s  e x c e e d e d  t h e  n o n m e t r o p o l i t a n  r a t e  
by 1 . 6  p e r c e n t  t o  0.4 p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  a  r e v e r s a l  o c c u r r e d  
b e t w e e n  1970 a n d  1973 which  t r a n s f o r m e d  t h e s e  r a t e s  t o  0 .9  
p e r c e n t  a n d  1 . 3  p e r c e n t ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y  ( M o r r i s o n ,  1 9 7 5 ,  p .  1 0 ) .  
The  dynamics  l e a d i n g  t o  t h e  d e c l i n e  o f  m e t r o p o l i t a n  r a t e s  
o f  g r o w t h  a r e  r e f l e c t e d  i n  T a b l e  1 1 ,  wh ich  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  
e v o l u t i o n  o f  P r o j e c t i o n  Bb i n  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l .  Note  t h a t  t h e  
r u r a l  g r o w t h  r a t e  d e c l i n e s  a n d  e v e n  t a k e s  o n  n e g a t i v e  v a l u e s  
f o r  a  1 5 - y e a r  p e r i o d ,  t h e n  i n c r e a s e s  g r a d u a l l y  a n d  u l t i m a t e l y  
o v e r t a k e s  t h e  u r b a n  g r o w t h  r a t e .  O b s e r v e  t h a t  t h i s  d o e s  n o t  
o c c u r  i n  t h e  i n t e r v a l s  i n  wh ich  n e t  m i g r a t i o n  t o  u r b a n  a r e a s  
i s  n e g a t i v e .  
Demoeconomic Consequences  o f  Growth a n d  U r b a n i z a t i o n  
F i g u r e  17 shows t h a t  t h e  t h r e e  p o p u l a t i o n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
examined  by C o a l e  v a r y  i n  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  t h e  
s h o r t ,  medium, a n d  l o n g  r u n s .  Changes  i n  a g e  c o m p o s i t i o n  a p p e a r  
a s  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  dependency  b u r d e n  d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  30 y e a r s  
and  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  f i r s t  p r i n c i p a l  i m p a c t  o f  r e d u c e d  f e r t i l i t y .  
A f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  g e n e r a t i o n ,  however ,  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  d i f f e r e n c e  
i n  dependency  b u r d e n s  r e m a i n s  r e l a t i v e l y  f i x e d .  The v a r i a t i o n  
be tween  t h e  a n n u a l  g r o w t h  r a t e s  o f  l a b o r  f o r c e  a g e  g r o u p s  b e g i n s  
t o  a p p e a r  a f t e r  1 5  y e a r s  a n d  r e a c h e s  a  maximum i n  a b o u t  70 
y e a r s ,  i . e . ,  45 y e a r s  a f t e r  f e r t i l i t y  s t a b i l i z e s  a t  i t s  r e d u c e d  
v a l u e .  Once e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  c o n t i n u e s  v i r t u a l l y  
unchanged  f o r e v e r  a f t e r  i n  t h e  two s c e n a r i o s .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  
l o n g  r u n  e f f e c t  o f  r e d u c e d  f e r t i l i t y  s t a r t s  t o  become s i g n i f i c a n t  
a f t e r  70 y e a r s ;  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  t h e  two a l t e r n a t i v e  p r o j e c t i o n s  
assume e s s e n t i a l l y  f i x e d  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  a g e  c o m p o s i t i o n s  and  
i n  r a t e s  o f  g r o w t h ,  and  v a r y  p r i m a r i l y  i n  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  s i z e s .  
T h i s  v a r i a t i o n  a s sumes  enormous  d i m e n s i o n s  a f t e r  150 y e a r s ,  
when,  i n  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  w i t h  c o n s t a n t  f e r t i l i t y ,  t h e  t o t a l  s i z e  
o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  a g e  b r a c k e t  15-64 i s  a b o u t  18  t i m e s  
l a r g e r  t h a n  t h a t  i n  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  w i t h  r e d u c e d  f e r t i l i t y .  
Table 1 1 .  Annual component rates of change and urbanization 
levels: Scenario Bb. 
Year 
Component r a t e s  o f  change 
(per thousand) 
Natural Growth Net Migration Growth Rate 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Regional share 
( i n  percent )  
Urban Rural 
I. - 
PERSONS ACED 15-64 
PROJECTION A / -4. 16 
PROJECTION B / 
I .. 
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Figurc 17 .  Dependency b u r d ~ n ,  annual rate o f  incrcasc and relative size of 
population aged 1 5 - 6 4  years: two  alternative projections. 
Source: Coale (1969) ,  p.  6 6  
The process of national modernization and development 
depends in a very direct way on the capacity of an economy to 
increase its level of net investment. Recognizing that this is 
only a necessary and not a sufficient condition, Coale argues 
that the low fertility population can better divert resources 
from production for current consumption to net investment aimed 
at the enhancement of future productivity. 
The two projected populations in the labor force age proups 
in Figure 17 differ by only 4 percent after 25 years. It is not 
unreasonable, therefore, to assume that national inccme is at 
that point the same for the two scenarios. The pressure for 
allocating a much higher proportion of the national product for 
consumption then would be greater in the higher fertility popula- 
tion because of its greater dependency burden. Families with 
many children, it is frequently argued, save less than those with 
fewer children, and the capacity of their governments and 
economies to raise the level of net investment, therefore, will 
be seriously impaired. 
The short run depressing influence of high dependency on 
savings and investment is exacerbated in the middle run by a 
high growth rate of the labor force population. A larger labor 
force requires a larger capital stock to achieve the same 
productivity per capita. Adopting as a rule of thumb a capital- 
output ratio of 3, Coale concludes that with net investment 
growing at the respectable rate of 15 percent of national income, 
a "population with a rate of growth of three percent in its 
labor force can, with such a level of investment, add about two 
percent per year to the endowment of capital per worker" 
(Coale, 1969, pp. 70-71). It therefore will be able to add 
less to the productive capacity of the economy than a population 
with a less rapid rate of labor force growth. Thus, reduced 
fertility not only generates, in the short run, a population 
with fewer consumers among whom to divide a given output; it 
also helps, in the middle run, to generate a larger national 
output which to divide. 
Finally, the concern with too great a density of people for 
available resources, i.e., with "overpopulation", stems from the 
belief that per capita output declines above some ratio of 
workers to resources. It is argued that at some point an 
excessively large population produces a depressing effect on 
per capita output. As Coale points out, however, the usefulness 
of the density concept in diagnosing population problems of less 
developed countries is limited. The politically feasible and 
realistic policies to influence the size of a national population 
are largely limited to fertility control, and such policies can 
affect the density of the labor force relative to resources 
only in the long run, i.e., after changes in dependency and labor 
force growth rates have already produced their major economic 
effects. Also, density is relevant primarily in economies that 
do not participate in international trade or that are principally 
organized around extractive activities such as mining, agricul- 
ture, 
The main demographic impacts of reduced fertility, 
described above, are not altered substantially by the intro- 
duction of migration as a component of change and the concomi- 
tant spatial subdivision of the national population into urban 
and rural sectors. Figures 18 and 19 show that for a given 
regime of migration ("a" or "b"), the major impacts of reduced 
fertility are, as in the Coale model: a decline in the burden 
of dependency in the short run, a lowering of the growth rate 
of the labor force population in the medium run, and a very much 
lower density of people to resources in the long run. The 
spatial model, however, does bring into sharp focus urban-rural 
differentials: ( 1 )  in dependency burdens and in the relative 
magnitudes of their decline following fertility reduction, and 
( 2 )  in initial growth rates of the labor force population and 
the paths of their gradual convergence in the long run. 
The dependency ratio in urban areas is 19 points lower than 
its rural counterpart at the start of the projection period. 
With constant fertility, the regional dependency burdens remain 
essentially unchanged. Declining fertility, however, narrows 
these differentials to almost a third of their original values, 
as the urban drop of 33 points is matched by a corresponding 
decline of 45 points in rural areas. 
The annual growth rates of the labor force population in 
urban and rural areas initially are 0.05 and 0.03 ,  respectively. 
For both migration regimes, however, they converge to approximately 
the same values in the long run: 0.04  in the constant fertility 
scenario and slightly above 0 . 0 1  in the reduced fertility 
projection. 
The major demographic impacts of increased rural-urban 
migration for a given regime of fertility are set out in Figures 
2 0  and 21,  in which are graphed the "a" and "b" projections for 
each of the two fertility regimes: fixed and reduced. These 
diagrams show that the influence of migration patterns in our 
scenarios is negligible with respect to dependency burdens and 
is of paramount importance, in the short and medium runs, with 
regard to the growth rate of the population aged 15-64.  In the 
long run migration also has a moderately powerful impact on the 
density of workers to resources in rural areas. 
Perhaps the most interesting observation suggested by Fig- 
ures 2 0  and 21 is the transitory nature of high rates of urban 
growth. In the "b" projections, urban growth rates in excess 
of 6 percent per annum occur only in the short run, as the 
national population is in its early phases of urbanization. 
This sudden spurt of growth of urban areas in the short run 
declines over the medium run, and in the long run levels off 
at a rate below that generated by the fixed migration regime. 
The growth curve of rural areas, of course, assumes a reverse 
trajectory, with the growth of the rural working population 
declining to relatively low, even negative, levels before in- 
creasing to stabilize at about the same level as that prevailing 
in the urban population. 
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population aged 15-64 years: alternative urban-rural projections. 
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Increased migration into cities reduces the size of rural 
populations and hence their density with respect to rural 
resources such as agricultural land. Figures 20 and 21 show 
that the relative size of the rural population aged 15-64 is 
over 2.5 times larger under the fixed migration schedules of 
projections "a" than under the increased rural-urban migration 
rates of projections "b". Thus the "b" scenarios create rapid 
urban growth and exacerbate human settlement problems, but at 
the same time reduce the density of rural populations to land 
and other rural resources. The "a" scenarios, on the other 
hand, give urban areas more time to cope with growth, but do so 
at the cost of increasing rural population densities. "Hyper- 
urbanization" and "rural overpopulation", therefore, are the 
two sides of a fundamental policy question reoarding development. 
The economic implications of the spatio-temporal behavior 
of dependency, growth, and density in the urbanization scenarios 
are much the sane as those described by Coale (1969), but they 
now include a spatial dimension. First, it is commonly believed 
that urban households save a larger fraction of their income 
than rural households. Thus the rapid urbanization arising out 
of increased rural-urban migration could have a positive impact 
on the national savings rate. But increased rural-urban mi- 
gration creates rapid urban growth, thereby reducing the per 
capita endowment of capital and infrastructure in cities and 
contributing to high rates of unemployment in exploding urban 
centers. Finally, rapid urban growth in less developed countries 
tends to be concentrated in a few very large cities, and "city 
bigness" is viewed by many as a negative feature of development. 
The argument is that urban agglomerations become inefficient 
once they pass a certain size threshold, and thereafter the 
social costs of further growth begin to exceed the corresponding 
social benefits. However, several economists have put forward 
the view that large urban agglomerations generate more benefits 
than costs and that efforts to retard their growth, therefore, 
are likely to reduce national economic growth rates (Gilbert, 
1976). 
Until recently, research on the economic influences of 
rural-urban migration in less developed countries has been 
largely ignored by national economic planners who have tended 
to emphasize 
... traditional economic variabies such as 
output growth rates, terms of trade, savings 
and investment, and relative efficiency. The 
efficient allocation of human resources between 
sectors, if discussed at all, has been 
assumed to be a natural out-growth of a 
self-adjusting mechanism which functioned 
to equate sectoral marginal productivities. 
Rural-urban migration was portrayed as a 
manifestation of this self-adjusting 
mechanism (with its implicit full-employment 
assumptions) and, as such, was not deemed to be 
of sufficient intrinsic importance to warrant 
detailed theoretical and empirical investi- 
gation. (Todaro, 1975, p. 367.) 
Growing levels of urban employment and underemployment in 
less developed countries have sharply underlined the inadequacy 
of ignoring the impacts of migration on development and have 
exposed to question the applicability of traditional economic 
models as descriptors of the practical socioeconomic realities 
of today's less developed world. The determinants and conse- 
quences of rural-urban migration and the relationships between 
such migration and the economic development of urban and rural 
areas are currently subjects of utmost importance and warrant 
careful scholarly examination. Agreement on this seems to be 
widespread. What is less evident is the conceptual framework 
one could profitably adopt in such an endeavor. Can the Coale- 
Hoover (1958) paradigm and its successors, which have served 
as an economic framework for examining the probable consequences 
of a drastic decline in the fertility rates of low-income 
countries such as India, be generalized and extended to serve 
as a framework for examining the probable consequences of 
significant increases in the rural-urban migration levels and 
urbanization rates of such countries? CJe now turn to a con- 
sideration of this question. 
MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
In developed countries, high levels of urbanization and 
high rates of urban growth have historically been associated 
with high and increasing per capita income. Figure 22, for 
example, indicates that the higher the percentage of a national 
population that is urban, the higher the national per capita 
gross national product (GNP). This positive association is 
generally attributed to factors such as rapid industrialization, 
increases in productivity, widespread literacy, improved 
nutrition, and advances in health services. 
Figure 23 shows that it is important to distinguish the 
effects of high levels of urbanization from those of high rates 
of urban population growth. The positive relationship between 
per capita GNP and urbanization level is difficult to discern 
in the plot of urban and per capita GNP growth rates that 
appears there. Indeed there seems to be a lack of any associa- 
tion whatsoever. We conclude, therefore, that although high 
proportions of national populations in urban areas appear to be 
positively associated with high levels of per capita GNP, one 
cannot infer from this that rapid urban growth fosters rapid 
increases in a nation's wealth or productivity. 
Most nations of the developing world are less urbanized 
than the developed countries, but are urbanizing more rapidly. 
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Source: United Nations (1976).  p. 28 
With a  few n o t a b l e  e x c e p t i o n s ,  t h e i r  p e r  c a p i t a  income i s  
g r o w i n g  s l o w l y  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e i r  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e ,  and 
t h e i r  d e v e l o p m e n t  i s  much t o o  complex t o  b e  s t u d i e d  w i t h  t h e  
a i d  o f  s i m p l e  p l o t s  s u c h  a s  t h o s e  f o u n d  i n  F i g u r e s  22 and  23.  
A f u l l e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  
a r e  h i d d e n  i n  t h e s e  g r a p h s  r e q u i r e s  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  and  
e s t i m a t i o n  o f  a  model t h a t  i n t e r c o n n e c t s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  c o n t r i b -  
u t i n g  s e c t o r s  o f  demoeconomic g r o w t h .  
F i g u r e  24 se ts  o u t  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  s t r u c t u r e  of  s u c h  a  
macrodemoeconomic model .  Here c h a n g e s  i n  p o p u l a t i o n  a r e  
a l l o w e d  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  l e v e l  o f  o u t p u t  d i r e c t l y ,  and  t h e  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  ( e . g .  l a n d )  c a n  b e  i n c l u d e d  
i n  t h e  same a g g r e g a t e  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n .  I d e a l l y  t h e  demo- 
economic  g r o w t h  model  s h o u l d  d i s a g g r e g a t e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n t o  u r b a n  
a n d  r u r a l  components  and d i s t i n g u i s h  a g r i c u l t u r a l  f rom non- 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n .  
D u a l i s t i c  Models o f  Demoeconomic Growth 
A l a r g e  number o f  s t u d i e s  h a v e  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  m i g r a t i o n  
u s u a l l y  is  a  r e s p o n s e  t o  economic  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  and  t h a t  t h e  
m i g r a n t  g e n e r a l l y  improves  h i s  w e l l - b e i n g  by rrioving. The n e t  
b e n e f i t s  o f  h i s  move t o  s o c i e t y ,  however ,  a r e  much more  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  d e t e r m i n e .  S i n c e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  be tween  m i g r a t i o n  and  
d e v e l o p m e n t  a r e  m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l  and complex,  e v a l u a t i o n s  o f  
t h e i r  i n t e r a c t i o n  and  t h e i r  s o c i e t a l  i m p a c t s  c a l l  f o r  a  g e n e r a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  s y s t e m s  framework.  
M i g r a t i o n  between r u r a l  and  u r b a n  a r e a s  c h a n g e s  p o p u l a t i o n  
a n d  l a b o r  f o r c e  g rowth  i n  b o t h  r e g i o n s .  I t  a l s o  c h a n g e s  s a v i n g s -  
i n v e s t m e n t  b e h a v i o r  and  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  c a p i t a l  s t o c k .  I t  a l t e r s  
l a b o r  f o r c e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and  b o t h  a f f e c t s  and is  a f f e c t e d  by 
r u r a l - u r b a n  income d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  A f o c u s  o n  t h e  b e h a v i o r  o f  
o n l y  o n e  o f  t h e s e  a s p e c t s  w h i l e  t h e  o t h e r s  a r e  h e l d  unchanged 
c a n  l e a d  t o  e r r o n e o u s  p o l i c y  c o n c l u s i o n s .  
A f u l l e r  s e t  o f  s o c i a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  r u r a l - u r b a n  mig ra -  
t i o n  c a n  b e  c a p t u r e d  w i t h  a  m o d e l l i n g  f ramework t h a t  e x p l i c i t l y  
i n c o r p o r a t e s  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  be tween d e m o g r a p h i c  and  economic  
c h a n g e .  B u t  p r o g r e s s  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  s u c h  macroeconomic  
mode l s  h a s  been  s l o w ,  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  we h a v e  n o t  advanced  
much beyond t h e  p i o n e e r i n g  f ramework p r o v i d e d  by C o a l e  and  Hoover 
two d e c a d e s  ago .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  t h e  o u t l i n e s  o f  a  p r o f i t a b l e  and  
r o b u s t  p a r a d i g m  a r e  e m e r g i n g  o u t  o f  s t u d i e s  t h a t  h a v e  t r i e d  t o  
e x p l o i t  t h e  n a t u r a l  i n t e r s e c t i o n  w i t h i n  e c o n o m i c s  o f  d u a l i s t i c  
g r o w t h  t h e o r y ,  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  a n a l y s i s ,  a n d  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
economic  h i s t o r y .  The u t i l i t y  o f  s u c h  mode l s  can  b e  d e f e n d e d  
w i t h  a n  a rgumen t  b a s e d  n o t  s o l e l y  on  t h e i r  u s e f u l n e s s  " a s  
a b s t r a c t  a n a l y t i c a l  c o n s t r u c t s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  on  t h e i r  u s e f u l n e s s  
a s  q u a n t i t a t i v e  t o o l s  f o r  i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e  
o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s "  ( K e l l e y  and  W i l l i a m s o n ,  1973 ,  p .  4 5 0 ) .  
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Dualistic models of modern economic growth typically divide 
a low-income economy into an agricultural-rural sector, which 
produces a single consumption good, and an industrial-urban 
sector, whose output is divided between consumption and invest- 
ment. Both sectors employ labor and capital to produce their 
outputs; the agricultural sector, in addition, utilizes land. 
Cobb-Douglas production functions are normally adopted for the 
agricultural sector and CES production functions are often 
assumed for the industrial sector. Technological change is 
specified differentially to capture dualism in production, and 
urban and rural residents are assumed to differ in their con- 
sumption and savings behavior. Growth of the labor force is 
given exogenously, in most instances, whereas growth of capital 
stock is determined endogenously by means of a savings-invest- 
ment equation. 
Several directions for dualistic model development were 
suggested by Kelley ( 1973 )  in a recent review of the role of 
population in models of modern economic growth. Heading the 
list of desired revisions of the "standard" model was the 
endogenization of population growth: 
Models in which population is endogenous are 
particularly relevant for two specific policy- 
oriented reasons. First, if population 
growth responds to economic conditions, 
then typical theoretical and empirical 
estimates of population's impact will be 
biased. For example, if population growth 
exerts a negative impact on the level and 
the pace of economic progress, and if 
family size varies inversely with economic 
conditions, then population growth will 
d e c Z i n e  in response to its own hypothesized 
negative impact on the economy. Its n e t  
adverse impact on growth will therefore 
be quantitatively less than in the case 
where population growth is assumed to be 
exogenously given .... Second, if population 
growth is endogenous and sensitive to the 
variables used to assess its impact-- 
pollution, economic growth, social sta- 
bility, employment--then policy recomrnenda- 
tions should be formulated in a framework 
analyzing population's n e t  impact. The 
relevant research issues include the speed 
of adjustment of population growth to policy 
objectives--and the extent to which the 
adjustment level is in some sense 'appro- 
priate'. (Kelley, 1973,  p. 40.) 
Kelley also emphasizes the importance of sectoral dis- 
aggregation. He argues that because the rate of economic 
development is associated with the rate of structural change, 
along such dimensions as degrees of industrialization and 
urbanization, models used for policy purposes should incorporate 
sectoral disaggregations. Such disaggregations should include, 
for example, the impact of population growth on the composition 
of demand as between urban and rural goods and the response of 
population growth to the rate of structural economic change 
when urban areas are assumed to foster a lower family size than 
is found in rural areas. The latter has already received some 
attention in the preceding section of this paper; the former 
will be examined in the next section. Here we shall return to 
our discussion of dualistic models of demoeconomic growth and 
clcsely examine a recent prototype of such a model in which 
the most important endogenous population variable is internal 
migration. 
A Prototype Model of Migration and Development 
Population's role in models of economic growth has been 
substantially enlarged in recent years. Most of the well-known 
models developed thus far have focused on impacts of population 
growth on per capita output (or income). Only a few models have 
also taken into account the influences of economic variables on 
population growth. Fewer yet have included internal migration 
as an endogenous variable affecting growth and development. 
A prototype model of macrodemoeconomic growth should sketch 
out the main relationships determining the demographic and 
economic evolution of a nation experiencing modernization and 
development. It should contribute to the understanding of 
population's principal impacts on socioeconomic change and of 
the consequences of such change on demographic growth and 
distribution. In order to deal with questions of urbanization, 
such a model should distinguish between agricultural and non- 
agricultural production sectors and between rural and urban 
populations. Differential patterns of fertility, mortality, 
and internal migration should be incorporated explicitly, and 
governmental policy variables should constitute an important 
part of the model. 
Instead of reviewing the several existing demoeconomic 
models that in general satisfy these criteria, we shall describe 
a single prototype model that resembles and draws on the others.* 
*Several reviews and assessments of demoeconomic modelling have 
been published. Among the best are those of Robinson (19751, 
Robinson and Horlacher (1 971 ) , and Arthur and McNicoll (1 975) . 
The model outlined below was developed by Lorene Yap as part 
of a doctoral dissertation and is described in greater detail 
in Yap (1976). It is representative of a growing class of 
dualistic demoeconomic models that could contribute to an 
improved understanding of the societal conseguences of rural- 
urban migration in developing countries. 
Yap presents a three-sector neoclassical model of rural- 
urban growth with internal migration explicitly specified as an 
endogenous variable that both influences and is influenced by 
regional differentials in economic well-be-ing. The model 
describes a disequilibrium process of growth in which firms 
maximize profits and individuals maximize utility. Migration 
between urban and rural sectors is viewed as a means of 
equalizing factor returns. 
... rural-urban sectoral differences are 
emphasized in the model. In particular, 
there are higher capital and labor 
productivity and rates of technological 
change in the modern urban than in the 
rural and traditional urban sectors; 
higher rates of natural population growth 
for the rural than for the urban population; 
and higher marginal savings propensities 
for urban workers and businesses, and 
higher tax rates for urban workers, than 
for their rural counterparts. Urban 
population growth also generates pressures 
for more urban investment by the government, 
as well as for higher per capita public 
service expenditures in urban than in 
rural areas. With these sectoral differ- 
ences a transfer of population from rural 
to urban areas will change the productivity 
of both labor and capital in the two areas, 
the growth of both factors, and therefore, 
the growth potential of the sectors. 
(Yap, 1976, p. 122.) 
The Yap model was estimated using 1950-1965 data for 
Brazil, and simulation techniques were used to assess the 
impact of rural-urban migration on the growth of the Brazilian 
GNP during that 15-year period. A historical growth path and 
two alternative paths of the Brazilian economy were simulated, 
each with a different rate of internal migration. The differ- 
ences between the historical simulation and simulations using 
a lower migration flow were assumed to reflect the importance 
of migration in determining the growth rate of GNP during the 
period 1950 to 1965. 
Table 12 sets out the principal results of Yap's three 
simulations. Run R1 is the historical simulation with observed 
Table 12. Simulation runs with alternative migration levels. 
-. 
Run RI Rsln R1 Run R1 
(nr1tw.l mrrnt~on (miention ~srarnelcrs (m!rmtion plrrnmerern 
Ievrl) mluced by 0.3) set to LCIU) 
Variable 
Average Av~rispo AI.PIBYC 
gmrlh  grou 11) grcall! 
rate Tnitird Find mtc Final rate Find 
(5'nl Y F U ~  Y E ~ I  ? year (?) \.ear 
I. Migration as proportion 
of urban population 0.03 0.02 0.02 0 
2. Urban population (mill.) 5.1 17.5 37.3 4.1 32.0 2.4 25.0 
a. Proportion of Lola1 
populalion 035 0.47 0.33 0.31 
3. Incon~c  per capita ( 8 )  6.7 YW 441 9-4 41s 1.9 391 
s. Rurn! 1.5 162 200 13 193 1 .O 186 
b. Urbzo 1.9 557 716 2.2 759 3.0 962 
4. Inco111e or value added 6.9 16.0 569 6.6 33.6 6-5 31.7 
(Sbill ) 
a. A:rirulti~rc 3.3 5.3 8.4 3.9 9.3 4.7 10.4 
a. Modrrn 7.1 92 25.6 6.5 23.4 5.7 20.9 
c. Traditional 4.9 05 12 2.9 0.9 -21 04 
5. Capital stock ($bill.) 64 S7.0 70.6 68 776 4.9 76.1 
a. Agricullurc 3.3 13.1 21.1 3.4 21.5 3 6  22.0 
b, hl<~rlr.;n sector 6 3 23.9 58.1 0 56.0 5 0  5:i.l 
6. Scc:or~I ~r::~~Ioyrncnt a5
propol.llon o i  totzl 
cml'loy~~rc:lt 
a .  A~rict11111rc 1S 0.65 0.53 2.7 0.60 3 7 0.69 
I). ~IO<!~:I :L 62 O f 1  035 45 0.31 3.5 037 
(1) s!ii!!ccl 5 5  0.10 0.15 4.6 0.12 3.3 0.10 
(2)  un.skillcd 5.0 0.16 020 4.4 0.19 3.6 0.17 
e .  T~adir lonal  4.9 0.09 0.12 2.9 0.09 -2.1 0.M 
7. Wagc dilTcrc11tials 
a .  R t~ca l -~~rba l i  0.37 0.36 0.33 0.29 
b, l t~ir ; i l -urba~i:  
611-k~llecl o ~ l l y  059 057 0.53 0.47 
c. U1ba11 unskilled- 
urhnn skillcd 0.33 0.35 0.31 0.34 
8. Scclornl w;l-v in<vlu:ll~l,v 313 4.34 4.63 6.93 
Source: Yap (19761, pp. 133-134 
migration levels. Runs R2 and R3 are the two "counterfactual" 
simulations: the first assumed that migration was half as 
sensitive to regional wage differentials as it actually was; 
the second assumed that migration did not occur at all. 
An examination of the major economic conseauences of the 
two counterfactual experiments reveals four significant impacts 
occasioned by the reduction in rural-urban migration: 
1. Reducing migration reduces the growth rates of total 
and per capita GNP; 
2. Reducing migration increases agriculture's share of 
total output; 
3. Reducing migration reduces the accumulation of capacity 
for future growth; 
4. Reducing migration increases sectoral ineaualities. 
Yap's simulations indicate that migration made a positive 
contribution to Brazil's postwar development. A 50 percent 
reduction in the values taken on by the parameters of the 
migration function lowers the average annual growth rate of GNP 
from 5.9 to 5.6 percent. A further drop to 5.2 percent follows 
from a complete prohibition of migration. A similar decline 
occurs in per capita terms, with the annual per capita GNP 
growth rate declining from 2.7 to 2.4 and 1.9 percent, 
respectively. 
A reduction in rural-urban migration increases the growth 
of agricultural output from 3.3 to 3.9 percent annually, as 
migration's sensitivity to wage differentials is reduced to 
half of its previous level, and to 4.7 percent annually as 
migration drops to zero. At the same time, the annual growth 
rate of the modern sector's output decreases from 7.1 to 6.5 
and 5.7 percent, respectively. The output of the traditional 
sector also declines, and actually contracts at the rate of -2.1 
percent per year in the run with zero migration. 
A reduction in migration lowers the capacity for future 
growth, according to the counterfactual simulations reported in 
Table 12. Growth capacity, measured in terms of physical and 
human capital stocks, declines with reduced migration. Terminal 
stocks of physical and human capital (the latter measured by 
the fraction of skilled workers), which are $79.5 billion and 
15 percent, respectively, in the historical simulation, drop to 
$77.5 and $75.1 billion and to 12 and 10 percent, respectively, 
in the two counterfactual simulations with lowered migration 
levels. 
Finally, the counterfactual simulations indicate that 
migration contributes positively to a reduction in the growing 
inequality between the urban and the rural sector. Yap's model 
shows t h a t  b o t h  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  wage i n e ~ u a l i t y  i n  t h e  l a b o r  
f o r c e  and t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n  p e r  c a p i t a  income between s e c t o r s  
i n c r e a s e  when r u r a l - u r b a n  m i g r a t i o n  i s  reduced  below i t s  
h i s t o r i c a l  l e v e l .  More wage i n e a u a l i t y  and a  l a r g e r  d i f f e r e n -  
t i a l  i n  p e r  c a p i t a  income a r e  r e p o r t e d  i n  T a b l e  12 f o r  t h e  
f i n a l  y e a r  o f  t h e  two c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s  t h a n  f o r  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  
s i m u l a t i o n .  
The p r i n c i p a l  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  p r o t o t y p e  model o f  m i g r a t i o n  
and development  d e s c r i b e d  above add f u r t h e r  w e i g h t  t o  arguments  
d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  major  e f f o r t s  t o  c u r b  r u r a l  t o  u rban  m i g r a t i o n  
i n  t h e  l e s s  deve loped  wor ld .  The p o w e r f u l  p r i v a t e  i n c e n t i v e s  
and t h e  a p p a r e n t l y  s u b s t a n t i a l  s o c i a l  g a i n s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  such  
m i g r a t i o n  a r e  a p t  t o  make p o l i c i e s  t o  r e s t r i c t  r u r a l - u r b a n  
m i g r a t i o n  ve ry  c o s t l y .  U r b a n i z a t i o n  p o l i c i e s  i n  t h e  l e s s  
deve loped  n a t i o n s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be  more s o c i a l l y  
b e n e f i c i a l  i f  t h e i r  f o c u s  i s  on managing r a p i d  u rban  growth and 
r e d u c i n g  urban p o v e r t y  r a t h e r  t h a n  c u r t a i l i n g  t h e  f low o f  
m i g r a n t s  t o  c i t i e s .  Such a  p o l i c y  p e r s p e c t i v e  l e a d s  n a t u r a l l y  
t o  a n  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  r e s o u r c e  and s e r v i c e  demands o f  r a p i d  
u r b a n i z a t i o n .  
RESOURCE AND SERVICE DEMANDS OF A RAPIDLY URBANIZING POPULATION 
What a r e  t h e  r e s o u r c e  and s e r v i c e  demands o f  u r b a n i z a t i o n  
l i k e l y  t o  be  d u r i n g  t h e  n e x t  30 t o  50 y e a r s  i n  t h e  l e s s  deve loped  
n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  wor ld?  How i m p o r t a n t  w i l l  urban  popuZation growth  
be  r e l a t i v e  t o  urban economic growth a s  a  g e n e r a t o r  o f  i n c r e a s e d  
l e v e l s  o f  demand? To what e x t e n t  would t h e  management problems 
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  mee t ing  t h e s e  demands be  e a s e d  i f  u r b a n i z a t i o n  
r a t e s  were s i g n i f i c a n t l y  reduced?  These and r e l a t e d  q u e s t i o n s  
a r e  r e c e i v i n g  i n c r e a s i n g  a t t e n t i o n  a s  p a r t  o f  a  g e n e r a l  c o n c e r n  
o v e r  whe ther  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e  w i l l  u l t i m a t e l y  o u t s t r i p  t h e  
growth i n  food s u p p l i e s  and e x h a u s t  t h e  w o r l d ' s  s t o c k  o f  n a t u r a l  
r e s o u r c e s .  
Resources  and s e r v i c e s  a r e  demanded by p e o p l e ;  h e n c e ,  i f  
a l l  e l s e  i s  f i x e d ,  t h e  l e v e l  o f  demand s h o u l d  be  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  
p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  p o p u l a t i o n  s i z e .  Demand above t h i s  l e v e l  may 
be  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  a f f l u e n c e .  F o r  example ,  K e y f i t z  (1976)  
c a l c u l a t e s  t h a t  US energy  consumption would have r i s e n  from i t s  
1947 l e v e l  o f  1.21 b i l l i o n  t o n s  o f  c o a l  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  1 .77 
b i l l i o n  t o n s  i n  1973 i f  it mere ly  k e p t  p a c e  w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n  
i n c r e a s e .  The f a c t  t h a t  energy  consumption r o s e  beyond t h a t  
t o t a l  t o  2.55 b i l l i o n  t o n s  i n  1973 was due t o  a f f l u e n c e ,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  K e y f i t z .  Thus o f  t h e  t o t a l  i n c r e m e n t  o f  1 .34  
b i l l i o n  t o n s ,  0.56 b i l l i o n  was due t o  p o p u l a t i o n  g rowth  and 
0 .78 b i l l i o n  t o  a f f l u e n c e  ( F i g u r e  2 5 ) .  
The a s s o c i a t i o n  between energy  consumption and a f f l u e n c e  
i s  more e x p l i c i t l y  shown i n  F i g u r e  26,  which p l o t s  p e r  c a p i t a  
energy  consumption a g a i n s t  p e r  c a p i t a  income f o r  96 n a t i o n s .  
The c o r r e l a t i o n  is  s t r i k i n g ,  and it r e f l e c t s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a s  

a  p o o r  c o u n t r y  d e v e l o p s ,  it r e q u i r e s  a  l a r g e r  t h r o u g h p u t  o f  
e n e r g y  r e s o u r c e s  t o  r u n  i t s  economy a n d  s u p p l y  t h e  n e e d s  o f  
i t s  p o p u l a t i o n .  
The r e l a t i o n s h i p s  be tween  demoeconomic c h a n g e  a n d  p a t t e r n s  
o f  r e s o u r c e  a n d  s e r v i c e  demands a r e  i m p e r f e c t l y  u n d e r s t o o d .  The 
demograph ic  and  e c 0 n o r . i ~  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  t h e  l e v e l  and  composi -  
t i o n  o f  demand a r e  s e v e r a l ,  b u t  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  f i r s t  approxima-  
t i o n  may b e  o b t a i n e d  by c o n s i d e r i n g  o n l y  t h e  i m p a c t s  o f  c h a n g e s  
i n  t h e  s i z e  o f  a  g i v e n  p o p u l a t i o n  a n d  i n  t h e  t o t a l  income a t  
i t s  d i s p o s a l .  
I f  t a s t e s  and  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  r ema in  s t a b l e ,  t h e n  t h e  
demand f o r  a  g i v e n  commodity o r  s e r v i c e  may b e  shown t o  grow 
a t  a  r a t e  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  e q u a l  t o  t h e  sum o f  1 )  t h e  income demand 
e l a s t i c i t y  t i m e s  t h e  g r o w t h  r a t e  o f  p e r  c a p i t a  r e a l  income,  a n d  
2 )  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  demand e l a s t i c i t y  t i m e s  t h e  r a t e  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  
g r o w t h  (Kaneda,  1968 ,  p .  6 )  : 
w h e r e  D d e n o t e s  demand, Y i s  r e a l  income,  P i s  p o p u l a t i o n ,  n 
i s  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  i n c o n e ,  and  5 i s  
t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  p o p u l a t i o n ,  a n d  w h e r e  
t h e  d o t s  i n d i c a t e  t i m e  d e r i v a t i v e s  ( i . e . ,  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  v a l u e  
o f  t h e  v a r i a b l e  o v e r  t i m e ) . *  I f ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  p o s t u l a t e d  
demand f u n c t i o n  i s  homogeneous o f  d e g r e e  o n e ,  i . e . ,  i f  t h e r e  a r e  
no  s c a l e  economies  o f  demand, t h e n  5 = 1  - rl a n d  ( 1 1 )  s i m p l i f i e s  
t 0 
T h i s  e q u a t i o n  u s e f u l l y  c o n n e c t s  t h e  income e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand 
f o r  f o o d  w i t h  d a t a  on income,  p o p u l a t i o n ,  a n d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o d u c t i o n .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t a k i n g  a s  g i v e n  a  1  p e r c e n t  a n n u a l  
p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h  r a t e ,  a  3.8 p e r c e n t  r a t e  o f  g r o w t h  o f  p e r  
c a p i t a  income p e r  y e a r ,  a n d  a  1 . 6  p e r c e n t  a n n u a l  g r o w t h  r a t e  o f  
r i c e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  c o n s u m p t i o n ,  Kaneda u s e d  E q u a t i o n  12 t o  
i n f e r  t h a t  t h e  income e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  r ice  i n  J a p a n  
m u s t  h a v e  been  n = 0.21 (Kaneda,  1 9 6 8 ,  p .  7 ) .  T h u s ,  approx-  
i m a t e l y  o n e  h a l f  o f  t h e  o b s e r v e d  p e r c e n t a g e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
amount o f  r i ce  demanded was d u e  t o  g r o w t h  i n  p e r  c a p i t a  income,  
and  t h e  o t h e r  h a l f  t o  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e .  
* E l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  demand measu re  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n q e  i n  demand 
g e n e r a t e d  by a  u n i t  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n q e  i n  a v a r i a b l e  t h o u g h t  t o  
b e  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h a t  demand. 
The Influence of Spatial Distribution: The Demand for Food 
Patterns of food consumption undergo considerable change 
during the process of a country's urbanization and development. 
Two fundamental shifts are (1) a decline in the fraction of total 
per capita income that is spent on food (Engel's law), and (2) 
the change in the composition of the per capita food bundle. 
The share of food in private consumption expenditures (the so- 
called Engel ratio) declines from levels as high as 75 to 80 
percent in traditional poor societies to less than half of that 
in modern developed societies. The composition of the per 
capita food bundle also changes as consumers substitute "pre- 
ferred" food products, such as animal protein foods, for 
"inferior" food products such as starchy staples. 
Rapid urbanization has helped to shape new food consumption 
patterns in developing nations. Electrical kitchen appliances 
have expanded the range and variety of methods for preparing 
food. Increasing affluence in urban centers has led to grow- 
ing importation of exotic foods and such essential food items 
as meat and dairy products. 
Urbanization influences the level and composition of food 
consumption in a number of related ways. First, urban and 
rural populations typically have different consumption patterns. 
Thus a rapid change in the geographical distribution of a 
national population is bound to alter the aggregate demand for 
food. Second, an important consequence of rural-urban migration 
is a change in the pattern of income distribution as migrants 
gradually improve their income status. This change influences 
aggregate food consumption patterns; e.g., a given improvement 
in the income level of lower income groups would be expected to 
increase aggregate food demand more rapidly than in higher 
income groups. Finally, changes in tastes induced by urban 
development processes would be expected to further increase 
the aggregate elasticity of food demand. 
Recently published data for Japan indicate very clearly 
the substantial reduction in urban and rural Engel ratios that 
has followed the high growth rates of per capita income during 
the postwar years (Figure 27). For each of the three years 
included in Figure 27, the Engel ratio for urban households is 
lower than that for farm households. This in part reflects 
the higher per capita income of urban households. The fraction 
of total expenditure that is devoted to starchy staples 
(cereals, potatoes, etc.) is also lower for the urban population. 
As urban households are able, with increasing incomes, to 
modify their dietary habits, they tend to consume ever larger 
quantities of animal protein foods such as meat, dairy products, 
eggs, and fish. 
The differences in urban and rural food consumption patterns 
illustrated in Figure 27 also may be observed in the recent 
estimates of income elasticities developed by Kaneda (1968). 
URBAN HOUSEHOLDS FARM HOUSEHOLDS 
STARCHY S f  APLES 
A N l M A L  PROTEINS 
OTHER FOODS 
Figure 27. Percent of total household expenditures for specified food 
groups by urban and farm households in Japan. 
Source: Kaneda (1970), p. 423 
These a r e  s e t  o u t  i n  T a b l e  1 3  and r e v e a l  t h a t ,  a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  Enge l  r a t i o s ,  t h e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  f o r  a l l  f o o d ,  s t a r c h y  s t a p l e s ,  
and a n i m a l  p r o t e i n s  a r e  s m a l l e r  f o r  t h e  u rban  t h a n  f o r  t h e  
r u r a l  ( f a r m )  p o p u l a t i o n .  A p o s s i b l e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h i s  f a c t  
i s  t h e  g r e a t e r  v a r i e t y  and a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  goods 
i n  u rban  c e n t e r s .  A s  a  consequence ,  income expans ion  among 
farm h o u s e h o l d s  would i n c r e a s e  a g g r e g a t e  f o o d  consumption more 
t h a n  a  s i m i l a r  growth i n  income among urban  househo lds .  
T a b l e  1 3 .  Measured income e l a s t i c i t i e s  b a s e d  on househo ld  
budge t  s u r v e y s :  u rban  w o r k e r s '  h o u s e h o l d s  and fa rm 
h o u s e h o l d s ,  1 9 5 3 ,  1 9 5 7 ,  and 1 9 6 1 .  
b O t h e r  Year T o t a l  food  S t a r c h y  s t a p l e s a  Animal p r o t e i n s  food 
Urban Workers '  Households  
1 9 5 3  . 4 8  1  . I 9 6  . 7 5 0  - 5 9 0  
1 9 5 7  . 4 5 6  . 0 6 2  . 7 7 3  . 6 0 2  
1 9 6  1  . 4 7 2  . 0 7 5  . 7 0 0  . 5 8 5  
Farm Households 
1 9 5 3  . 5 2 9  . 4 6 6  1 . 1 1 7  . 4 1 2  
1 9 5 7  . 5 3 1  . 3 6 3  1 . 1 5 6  . 5 0 7  
1 9 6 1  . 5 2 9  . 15gc  1 . 0 8 7  . 7 2 0  
Estimates  were derived by weighted logari thmic regress ions ;  observa t ions  were 
weighted according t o  t h e  number of households represen ted  i n  each group. 
% e r e a l s  and s ta rchy  r o o t s  (e .g .  po ta toes )  f o r  farm households represented 
i n  each group. 
bt4eat, d a i r y  p roduc ts ,  eggs,  and f i s h .  
' ~ o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from zero a t  5 percen t .  
Source: Kaneda (1968) .  p. 2 2  
S e c t o r - s p e c i f i c  income e l a s t i c i t i e s  s u c h  a s  t h o s e  p r e s e n t e d  
i n  T a b l e  13 may be  combined w i t h  u r b a n  and r u r a l  v e r s i o n s  o f  
E q u a t i o n  12 t o  y i e l d  c r u d e  e s t i m a t e s  of  food  demand over  t i m e  
and s p a c e .  Assume, f o r  example ,  t h a t  t h e  ,income e l a s t i c i t y  f o r  
s t a r c h y  s t a p l e s  i s  0.1 i n  u r b a n  a r e a s  and 0 .4  i n  r u r a l  a r e a s .  
L e t  t h e  a n n u a l  growth r a t e s  o f  u rban  and r u r a l  incomes be 6 .5  
p e r c e n t  and 3 .3  p e r c e n t ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  (The l a t t e r  a r e  rough ly  
t h e  v a l u e s  p r e s e n t e d  f o r  B r a z i l  i n  T a b l e  1 2 . )  F i n a l l y ,  assume 
t h a t  P r o j e c t i o n  "Bb" i n  T a b l e  11 d e s c r i b e s  t h e  demographic 
e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  under  s t u d y .  Then, d u r i n g  t h e  i n i t i a l  
y e a r s ,  demand f o r  s t a r c h y  s t a p l e s  i n  u rban  a r e a s  w i l l  be  growing 
a t  a n  a n n u a l  r a t e  o f  a b o u t  
whereas  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  demand i n  r u r a l  a r e a s  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  
a t  t h e  a n n u a l  r a t e  o f  
I f  t h e  o n l y  changes  a f t e r  50 y e a r s  a r e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  
a n n u a l  growth r a t e s  o f  u rban  income t o  10 p e r c e n t  and o f  r u r a l  
income t o  4  p e r c e n t ,  t h e n  t h e  growth r a t e  o f  demand f o r  s t a r c h y  
s t a p l e s  s h o u l d  d e c l i n e  t o  0.034 i n  u rban  a r e a s  and 0 .014 i n  
r u r a l  a r e a s .  S i n c e  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  t h e  u rban  s h a r e  o f  t h e  
t o t a l  n a t i o n a l  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e d  from 20 p e r c e n t  t o  65 
p e r c e n t ,  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  n a t i o n a l  demand f o r  s t a r c h y  s t a p l e s  s h o u l d  
d e c l i n e  from a n  i n i t i a l  a n n u a l  growth r a t e  o f  a b o u t  3.2 p e r c e n t  
t o  one  c l o s e  t o  2 .7  p e r c e n t .  ( I f ,  a s  i s  l i k e l y ,  t h e  income 
e l a s t i c i t i e s  d e c l i n e  w i t h  i n c r e a s i n g  income, t h e n  t h i s  r e d u c t i o n  
s h o u l d  o f  c o u r s e  be  even g r e a t e r . )  
E q u a t i o n s  11 and 12 p r o v i d e  c r u d e  a p p r o x i m a t i o n s  of  de-  
mand changes  s t i m u l a t e d  by p o p u l a t i o n  and income growth i n  
s e t t i n g s  where t h e  assumpt ion  o f  s t a b l e  tastes and r e l a t i v e  
p r i c e s  i s  n o t  s e r i o u s l y  v i o l a t e d .  However, when food consump- 
t i o n  p a t t e r n s  change r a p i d l y ,  a s  t h e y  d i d  i n  pos twar  J a p a n ,  f o r  
example ,  t h e  i m p a c t s  of  p o s s i b l e  s h i f t s  i n  t a s t e s  and r e l a t i v e  
p r i c e s  s h o u l d  be t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t .  Kaneda (1968)  a t t e m p t s  t o  
do t h i s  by a d o p t i n g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  E q u a t i o n  1 1 :  
i n  which t h e  i n t e r c e p t  t e r m  is  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a  measure  o f  c h a n g e s  
i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  demand d e f i n e d  by t h e  p a r a m e t e r s  E and q. 
Using  h o u s e h o l d  b u d g e t  d a t a  f o r  J a p a n  a n d  r e l a x i n g  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  
t h a t  5 mus t  e q u a l  1  - n ,  Kaneda o b t a i n s  t h e  p a r t i a l  e l a s t i c i t i e s  
o f  f o o d  demand w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  f a m i l y  income a s  w e l l  a s  t o  
f a m i l y  s i z e .  T a b l e  14 p r e s e n t s  h i s  e s t i m a t e d  e l a s t i c i t i e s  and  
r e v e a l s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  two i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t s :  
1 .  Urban a n d  r u r a l  p a r t i a l  s i z e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  f o r  t o t a l  
f o o d  e x p e n d i t u r e s  d o  n o t  d i f f e r  n e a r l y  a s  much a s  p a r t i a l  
i n come  e l a s t i c i t i e s  ( 0 . 4 0 5  a g a i n s t  0 .455  f o r  t h e  f o r m e r ,  
a n d  0.462 a g a i n s t  0 .555  f o r  t h e  l a t t e r ) .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  
t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  u r b a n  a n d  r u r a l  h o u s e h o l d  con- 
s u m p t i o n  b e h a v i o r  may b e  a t t r i b u t e d  much more t o  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  income l e v e l s  t h a n  t o  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  
f a m i l y  s i z e .  
2.  Food g r o u p s  a r e  r a n k e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  p a r t i a l  i n c o m e  
e l a s t i c i t i e s ,  i n  d e s c e n d i n g  o r d e r  o f  m a g n i t u d e :  
a n i m a l  p r o t e i n s ,  o t h e r  f o o d s ,  t o t a l  f o o d ,  a n d  s t a r c h y  
s t a p l e s .  The c o r r e s p o n d i n g  r a n k i n g  i n  t e r m s  o f  p a r t i a l  
s i z e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  is  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  r e v e r s e .  The 
f i r s t  o r d e r i n g  r e f l e c t s  c o n s u m e r s '  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  t h e  
s e c o n d  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  f a m i l y  s i z e  o n  f o o d  c o n s u m p t i o n .  
F o r  example ,  a n i m a l  p r o t e i n s  a r e  p r e f e r r e d  t o  s t a r c h y  
s t a p l e s ,  b u t  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  f a m i l y  s i z e  makes i t s  members 
r e l a t i v e l y  p o o r e r  a n d  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  b a s i c  " n e e d "  f o r  
f o o d  e n e r g y .  As f a m i l y  s i z e  f o r  f a r m  h o u s e h o l d s  i n -  
c r e a s e s ,  t h e i r  c o n s u m p t i o n  o f  a n i m a l  p r o t e i n s  is  r e d u c e d .  
T a b l e  14 .  E s t i m a t e d  e l a s t i c i t i e s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  f a m i l y  s i z e  
a n d  t o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  p o s t w a r  y e a r s .  
C a t e g o r y  o f  e x p e n d i t u r e  S i z e  e l a s t i c i t y  Income e l a s t i c i t y  
T o t a l  f o o d  
S t a r c h y  s t a p l e s  
Animal  p r o t e i n s  
O t h e r  f o o d s  
T o t a l  f o o d  
S t a r c h y  s t a p l e s  
Animal  p r o t e i n s  
O t h e r  f o o d s  
- - - 
Urban Worke r s '  Househo lds  
. 405  
.461 
.327 
.394  
Farm Househo lds  
. 455  
.921 
-1 .125  
.274 
S o u r c e :  Kaneda ( 1 9 6 8 ) ,  p .  24 
A widely observed regularity associated with urbanization, 
development, and modernization is the decline of agricultural 
production and the corresponding rise in the importance of 
industrial production. The conventional explanation for this 
regularity points to the declining importance of food expendi- 
tures as income rises. But as Kelley (1969) observes, Engel 
curve analysis, with its primary focus on expenditure and income 
elasticities, can serve only as crude first approximation in 
any assessment of the influence of aggregate demand on industrial 
patterns: "Systematic changes in the rate of population growth, 
of ages, of average family size, and of urbanization (internal 
migration) are all part of economic development ... each of these 
factors exerts an impact on the size and composition of demand ..." 
(Kelley, 1969, p. 111). 
The Influence of Age Composition: The Demand for Personal 
Health Services 
In discussing the determinants of the demand for health 
care, we shall focus on personal health services only, i-e., 
"those provided for individuals by doctors, nurses, and health 
technicians ... to treat illness, prevent disease or disability, 
or facilitate such normal processes as human reproduction" 
(Corsa and Oakley, 1971, p: 372). Thus we shall exclude from 
consideration societal environmental health activities and such 
services as public information, education, vital registration, 
and health surveillance. 
Crude estimates of personal health care demands may be 
obtained by the use of appropriate service utilization ratios. 
Thus, for example, current ratios of health personnel and 
facilities to population may be applied to alternative population 
projections to develop estimates of future health care needs. 
However, as in the case of energy consumption in Figure 25, 
greater demands for health personnel and facilities arise not 
only from a growing population but also from an increasing 
level of income. Figure 28 indicates that this relationship, 
which is very evident in the less developed countries, may not 
persist in such a simple form once the countries reach a 
relatively high level of development. 
The spatial distribution of a population also needs to be 
taken into account in studies of health service requirements. 
Health service ratios in less developed countries, for example, 
are generally much higher in the major cities than in the rest 
of the country (see, for example, Table 15). As a result, most 
developing countries are striving to narrow the gap in the 
availability of health services that exists between urban and 
rural areas. This means that current rural service ratios are 
inadequate norms with which to scale levels of future health 
care needs for the rural population. 

Table 15 .  Projected service ratios per 1 0 , 0 0 0  population, 
Thailand, 1 9 7 0 .  
S e r v i c e  r a t i o s  
Personnel and in Thailand in in the 
facilities as a whole Bangkok rest of Thailand 
Hospital beds 9 . 1 4  4 1 . 5 5  5 . 8 6  
Physicians 0 .90  
Nurses 2 . 0 3  
Practical nurses 1 .29  3 .76  1 . 0 1  
Midwives 0 . 8 8  0 . 5 7  0 . 9 1  
Sanitarians 0 . 7 0  0 . 7 1  0 . 6 6  
Dentists 0 . 0 9 8  0 . 7 1  0 . 0 4 3  
Source: Jones ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  p. 1 1 9  
To obtain a more complete assessment of the impacts of 
different population trends on resource and service demands it is 
necessary to go beyond simple per capita ratios and examine the 
effect of changing age composition on such demands. Figure 2 9  
illustrates the relationships between age composition and demands 
for a number of services. These data show that demands for 
educational services, for example, occur largely between the 
ages of 5  and 2 0 ,  with a peak at age 1 0 .  Housing requirements, 
on the other hand, increase during the later years of child- 
bearing and hold steady until the ages of retirement. Jobs are 
in demand during the labor force participation ages of 1 5  to 6 5 .  
Food requirements increase until the late teens, peaking at about 
age 18 ;  after a slight decline they then level off and remain 
constant. Finally, health service demands are relatively high 
for infants and older adults; these age groups have the highest 
incidence of illness and require the most hospitalization. 
Illness and hospitalization rates tend to be higher among 
adults at all ages above 5 0  than among children in the 0-5  age 
group. Nevertheless, because of their relatively large numbers 
in high fertility populations, young children generate a 
significant proportion of the total health service demand. A 
decline in fertility does not reduce total health care requirements, 
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Figure 29. Time relationships between a birth and future 
service requirements. 
Source: Corsa and Oaklcy (1971), p. 370 
however, because the corresponding decline in the proportion of 
young children is offset by the increase in the proportion of 
older adults. 
Much of the variability in rates of illness (morbidity) and 
death (mortality) among different age and sex groups in a 
population can be attributed to differences in their underlying 
cause-of-illness or cause-of-death structure. By way of illus- 
tration, Table 16 presents death rates among US and Swedish 
males, by cause of death, for three broad aqe groups. These 
data reveal a striking variation of mortality with age. 
Teenagers and young adults in the USA are, on the average, 
very healthy, and their probabilities of dying of diseases are 
extremely small. Their probabilities of dying in accidents, 
however, are not that small, especially for males. Table 16 
indicates that out of 100,000 US males at age 15, over 1100 
will die in accidents before reaching age 25. More than half 
of these will lose their lives in automobile accidents. Combining 
these totals with deaths due to suicide and homicide, we find 
that deaths caused by violence in one form or another accounted 
for three out of every four male deaths in the 15-24 age group. 
This is in marked contrast to the corresponding aggregate rate 
for all US males, which is one in every ten. 
T a b l e  1 6 .  E x p e c t e d  number o f  d e a t h s  by c a u s e  p e r  1 0 0 , 0 0 0  m a l e s  
a t  v a r i o u s  a g e s :  U S A ,  1 9 6 8 ,  a n d  Sweden,  1967 .  
USA ( w h i t e  males  o n l y )  Sweden 
Cause of  Death 1 5 - 2 4  3 5 - 4 4  5 5 - 6 4  1 5 - 2 4  3 5 - 4 4  5 5 - 6 4  
Hear t  d i s e a s e s  2 8  9 9 9  9 9 4 0  2  2  3 6 9  5 2 9 3  
Neoplasms 1 0 3  5 0 7  4 6 9 7  1 1 0  3 4 3  3 1 5 9  
C e r e b r o v a s c u l a r  d i s e a s e  - - 1 1 9 6  6  7 6  9 5 0  
C i r r h o s i s  of  l i v e r  - 1 3 8  6 4 5  - 5 0  2 0 4  
Other  a c c i d e n t s  3 1  0  3 2 1  5 0 8  2 2 8  2 8 7  4 2 6  
I n f l u e n z a  and pneumonia 2 9  7  9 5 0 5  2  5  3  0  3 1 0  
Motor a c c i d e n t s  8 0 7  3  5  1  3 8 2  3 3 5  1 9 7  2 8 5  
S u i c i d e  1 1 3  2 3 2  3 4 8  1 4 0  4 2 7  5 2 0  
Homicide 7  5  9  8  6 2  9  4  9  
A l l  c a u s e s  
Source:  Fuchs ( 1 9 7 4 )  pp. 4 1 - 4 5  
Heart diseases become the major cause of death from about 
age 35 on, according to Table 16. Approximately one out of 
every 100 white US males dies of a heart attack or related 
disease in the 35-44 age group. Neoplasms, especially lung 
cancer, and cirrhosis of the liver both become important causes 
of death among US males from age 35. Thus the combined impact 
of smoking and drinking on health is considerable. 
The probabilities of dying during the 10-year period 
between ages 55 and 64 are substantially higher than during the 
entire 40-year period between ages 15 and 55. The principal 
reason is the striking increase in the probabilities of dying 
of a heart attack. According to Table 16, the death rate from 
this cause is ten times greater during late middle age than it 
is at ages 35-44, and over half of all deaths in the former 
age group are due to it. The chances of dying from lung cancer 
also increase to more than ten times the rate observed at 
ages 35-44. 
A comparison of the US and Swedish male death rates (Table 
16) sheds some light on the character of health problems among 
US males. Largely because of the high rate of violent deaths, 
the US rate at ages 15-24 is more than 60 percent higher than 
the corresponding rate in Sweden. The number of violent deaths 
per 100,000 individuals is 83 percent higher in the USA than 
in Sweden, whereas the differential in nonviolent deaths is only 
16 percent. 
The pattern changes in the 35-44 age group as the differen- 
tial in deaths from violence declines and that in deaths from 
heart diseases increases substantially. Between ages 55 and 65 
the US death rate is 63 percent higher than the rate in Sweden, 
and the US rate for heart diseases is approximately double the 
Swedish rate. 
As better control over such diseases as typhoid fever, 
diphtheria, whooping cough, and measles leads to major declines 
in mortality levels, death rates provide an increasingly incomplete 
description of a national population's general health status. 
Illnesses and disabilities associated with arthritis, mental 
illness, and sight and hearing problems are not reflected in 
mortality statistics, yet much of a nation's requirements for 
health care is connected with them. Moreover, as more people 
survive to older ages, chronic degenerative diseases including 
heart disease, cancer, and stroke become more common. Finally, 
it is important to recognize that future demands for health 
services also depend on the combined effects of a number of 
factors besides population. These include national decisions 
about the importance of health goals relative to other goals 
and about the health service functions that should be carried out 
by various kinds of health personnel: world technological 
developments; and levels of international technical assistance 
(Corsa and Oakley, 1971). 
POLICY ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS -
S c h o l a r s  and  p o l i c y m a k e r s  o f t e n  d i s a g r e e  when it comes t o  
e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  c u r r e n t  r a t e s  o f  r a p i d  u r b a n i z a -  
t i o n  and m a s s i v e  r u r a l - u r b a n  m i g r a t i o n  i n  t h e  less d e v e l o p e d  
w o r l d .  Some see t h e s e  t r e n d s  a s  e f f e c t i v e l y  s p e e d i n g  up n a t i o n -  
a l  p r o c e s s e s  o f  s o c i o e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  w h e r e a s  o t h e r s  b e l i e v e  
t h e i r  c o n s e q u e n c e s  t o  b e  l a r g e l y  u n d e s i r a b l e  and  a r g u e  t h a t  b o t h  
t r e n d s  s h o u l d  b e  s lowed  down. 
Those  t a k i n g  t h e  n e g a t i v e  v i ew a r g u e  t h a t  most  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  a r e  " o v e r u r b a n i z e d "  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  u rban  g r o w t h  
r a t e s  h a v e  g r e a t l y  o u t d i s t a n c e d  r a t e s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  deve lopmen t  
and economic  g r o w t h .  T h i s  h a s  c r e a t e d  a n  i m b a l a n c e  t h a t  f i n d s  
c i t i e s  i n  t h e  less d e v e l o p e d  w o r l d  p e r p e t u a l l y  s t r u g g l i n g  w i t h  
cr i s i s .  D e s p i t e  s u b s t a n t i a l  g a i n s  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n ,  
new j o b s  d o  n o t  a p p e a r  a t  anywhere  n e a r  t h e  r a t e  r e q u i r e d  t o  
employ a  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  g r o w i n g  u r b a n  l a b o r  f o r c e .  
D e s p i t e  i m p r e s s i v e  improvements  i n  u r b a n  h o u s i n g ,  f o o d  a v a i l -  
a b i l i t y ,  e d u c a t i o n a l  s e r v i c e s ,  and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  f a c i l i t i e s ,  
s q u a t t e r  s e t t l e m e n t s  p r o l i f e r a t e ,  h u n g e r  and i l l i t e r a c y  a r e  i n  
e v i d e n c e  e v e r y w h e r e ,  and t r a f f i c  c o n g e s t i o n  i s  w o r s e  t h a n  b e f o r e .  
And, mos t  i m p o r t a n t ,  r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  c o u l d  o t h e r w i s e  b e  a p p l i e d  
t o  more d i r e c t l y  and  i m m e d i a t e l y  p r o d u c t i v e  u s e s  i n s t e a d  mus t  
b e  d i v e r t e d  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  e v e r - g r o w i n g  demands f o r  u r b a n  s o c i a l  
s e r v i c e s  a n d  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .  
S u p p o r t e r s  o f  c u r r e n t  u r b a n i z a t i o n  a n d  m i g r a t i o n  p a t t e r n s  
i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  p o i n t  t o  t h e  m o d e r n i z i n g  b e n e f i t s  o f  
u r b a n i z a t i o n  and  t o  t h e  improved w e l l - b e i n g  o f  mos t  r u r a l -  
u r b a n  m i g r a n t s .  They c o n t e n d  t h a t  u r b a n i z a t i o n  t r a n s f o r m s  
p e o p l e ' s  o u t l o o k  and  b e h a v i o r a l  p a t t e r n s  w h i l e  b r o a d e n i n g  t h e i r  
s k i l l s  and  f o s t e r i n g  i n  them a  g r e a t e r  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  i nnova -  
t i o n s  and  t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  g e n e r a t i n g  s u s t a i n e d  
w e a l t h  and  power i n  a  modern s o c i e t y .  They a l s o  a r g u e  t h a t  con- 
c e r n  on w e l f a r e  g r o u n d s  i s  p r o b a b l y  m i s p l a c e d ,  b e c a u s e  d e s p i t e  
j o b  i n s e c u r i t y  and  s q u a l i d  l i v i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  most  r u r a l - u r b a n  
m i g r a n t s  a r e  b e t t e r  o f f  t h a n  t h e y  w e r e  p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  move. 
T h e i r  t r a n s f e r  f rom t h e  f a rm t o  t h e  c i t y  e n a b l e s  them t o  r a i s e  
t h e i r  p e r s o n a l  income and  t o  o b t a i n  s o c i a l  s e r v i c e s  o f  a  much 
w i d e r  v a r i e t y  a n d  b e t t e r  q u a l i t y  t h a n  were a v a i l a b l e  t o  them 
b e f o r e .  
The t h r e e  p o p u l a t i o n - r e l a t e d  p o l i c i e s  mos t  f r e q u e n t l y  
s u g g e s t e d  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  u r b a n i z a t i o n  p rob lems  o f  less 
d e v e l o p e d  n a t i o n s  a r e  f e r t i l i t y  r e d u c t i o n ,  economic  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  
and r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  u r b a n  p o p u l a t i o n  away f rom t h e  l a r g e s t  
c i t i e s .  C o u n t r i e s  t h a t  have  a c h i e v e d  a  h i g h  s t a n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g ,  
i t  i s  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  a l s o  h a v e  e x p e r i e n c e d  s u b s t a n t i a l  d e c l i n e s  
i n  b i r t h  r a t e s .  And s u s t a i n e d  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  b i r t h  r a t e s  have  
n o t  been  a c c o m p l i s h e d  w i t h o u t  s i g n i f i c a n t  economic  g r o w t h .  More- 
o v e r ,  t h e  c o s t s  o f  s e r v i c e s  and  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  damages a p p e a r  t o  
i n c r e a s e  marked ly  w i t h  c i t y  s i z e .  Y e t ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  i s  
e v i d e n c e  t o  s u p p o r t  a l l  t h e s e  p o i n t s ,  i t  i s  by no means irre- 
f u t a b l e .  F e r t i l i t y  d e c l i n e s  h a v e  o c c u r r e d  w i t h o u t  economic  
growth; economic growth has occurred alongside populatimn growth. 
And convincing arguments have been put forward against a narrow 
cost-minimization perspective in the debate on city size. 
In this paper we have outlined what we believe to be three 
major components of any complete analysis of human settlement 
problems: the demographics of rapid urbanization, its demo- 
economic developmental aspects, and the resource-service demands 
that it generates. A great deal more needs to be known about 
these three processes before convincing evidence can be marshalled 
for or against rapid rates of urbanization. This evidence could 
shed some light on the following three important policy questions: 
1. Is it high fertility or high rural-urban migration that 
is the principal cause of current rapid rates of 
urbanization and urban growth in less developed countries, 
and which of these two components of population change 
should receive the greater attention of national 
population policy? 
2. Is a strategy of rapid industrialization, with its 
predominantly urban bias, the appropriate model for 
most developing countries, or should agricultural and 
rural development programs play a much larger role than 
they do today? 
3. Are the major urban agglomerations in the less developed 
world too large, and do they consurrte a disproportionate- 
ly large share of national resources and services, or is 
the problem one not of urban size but of urban growth 
management? 
The countries of the less developed world are currently 
faced with the problem of accommodating more people in urban 
areas within a shorter period of time than did the developed 
countries. The dimensions of the task confronting the cities of 
developing nations are, therefore, truly gargantuan. But there 
are grounds for optimism: accelerating population increases in 
urban areas have been absorbed at rising income levels in a 
number of developing countries. What is sorely needed, however, 
is enlightened management of the urbanization process to remove 
systemic inefficiencies and inequalities, and simultaneous 
preparation of already growing cities for a very much larger 
increment of growth in the future. 
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